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 Abstract 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is an important area connecting academic 
researchers with the practitioners due to its critical role in financial risk 
management as required by the Basel Accord. While both academic 
researchers and the practitioners recognize that VaR models provide a 
convenient method for quantifying market risk, their objectives and 
interests in VaR can be quite different. Academic researchers are 
primarily interested in the accuracy of VaR models in forecasting market 
risk. These results are of interest to the regulator to ensure adequate risk 
mitigation is undertaken by banks as a result of inadequate capital 
reserves. Banks, however, can choose to use standardized or the 
internally designed VaR models to measure market risk.  
The thesis aims to demonstrate the differences in approaches and 
objectives to VaR modelling and forecasting by academic researchers and 
the practitioners. In theory, the more complex VaR models may be 
preferred by the academic researchers for risk forecasting as these 
models capture volatility structures of asset returns that are usually not 
directly observable. However, these models raise some difficulties in 
practice. For an ADI who trades large and complex portfolios of financial 
assets and derivatives daily, these models require continuous 
constructing and updating new volatility forecasts that come with high 
transaction costs. Therefore, combining these different objectives is 
crucial to developing a more practical approach that can satisfy both the 
literature and regulatory objectives.  
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 The thesis begins with the background of the banking system in Australia 
and critically reviews the impact of the Basel Accord in Australian 
Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) over time. The thesis also 
investigates the precision of VaR models to measuring market risk and 
the regulatory role played by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) in supervising these ADIs.  
Models of time-varying volatility can be used to forecast VaR for the 
purpose of financial risk management. This thesis proposes developing 
more appropriate models that may assist Australian ADIs to calculate 
capital adequacy charges as a protection against market risk. This thesis 
also provides the first empirical comparison of the impact of model 
specification in estimating tail index and VaR. A consistent estimator of 
the tail index for the asymmetric extension of Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GJR-GARCH) error is used 
as an alternate method to forecast VaR. The empirical results suggest 
that the proposed method performs well against the more traditional 
approaches based on conditional and unconditional variances. Given that 
the regulator prefers ADIs to use VaR models that display appropriate 
statistical properties, the performance of these models is evaluated by 
various tests to assess the quality of VaR forecasts. In addition to these 
tests, the market risk capital charges are also calculated to capture the 
opportunity costs of using each model. 
This thesis then analyses the importance of accommodating time-varying 
conditional correlations in forecasting VaR. The performance of VaR 
forecasts produced by Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model of 
Bollerslev (1990) is compared with the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC) model of Engle (2002) and the Time-Varying Conditional 
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 Correlation (TVC) model of Tse and Tsui (2002). The results find that VaR 
forecasts based on the DCC models are superior to VaR forecasts based 
on the CCC models. The results also suggest that the selection of an 
underlying distribution is more important than the choice of a model to 
forecast VaR. 
The final section of this thesis examines the adequacy of reported VaR 
forecasts. This section focuses on whether the reported VaR forecasts 
provide any new information to investors and the bank regulators to 
assessing the differences in market risk exposures for each ADI. One of 
the main objectives for Basel III is to strengthen banks’ transparency and 
disclosures. The thesis finds that the current financial reporting 
environment in Australia does not provide academic researchers and the 
regulator enough information to assess the quality of VaR forecasts 
reported by ADIs. It is worth noting that the requirements for banks to 
disclose information more completely can sometimes be very costly and 
may not necessary increase transparency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Charles Dickens began his Tale of Two Cities with the lines: 
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was 
the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of 
Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had 
everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct 
to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way. . . .” 
These famous lines hint at the novel’s central tension between love and 
family, and on the one hand, oppression and hatred, on the other. The 
opening quotation characterizes the tension between academic 
researchers and the practitioners including investors, banks and the 
regulator in the use and application of Value-at-Risk (VaR) to model and 
forecast market risk.  
An academic research is often quantitative with sophisticated methods 
and statistical details that are unfamiliar to the practitioners. Sometimes, 
the results can be inconsistent and lack a normative conclusion. Hence, 
the practitioners may be constrained in pursuing increased engagement 
with academic researchers due to lack of belief. This could lead to a less 
tolerant view and serious scepticism as to the ability of academic 
research to provide insights that are of relevance. Academic researchers, 
on the other hand, may not engage with the practitioners for different 
reasons. For a researcher, the academic system does not explicitly 
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 encourage strong research-related practitioner communication, but 
strongly supports the publications in peer-reviewed academic journals. 
Therefore, the academic researchers would rather engage their work 
through conferences and journals. These academic articles are 
exclusively read and assessed by a group of fellow academics. Hence, this 
restricts the ability of the academic researchers to connect with the 
practitioners.  
In a regulatory capacity, the relationship between banks and the 
regulator with the academic researchers is not without tension and 
disagreement. They are more like separate entities pursuing their own 
agendas and concerns. The general society requires the regulator to 
regulate banks adequately, yet the nature of the regulation in practice is 
diverse. Banks are meant to follow the regulatory requirements of which 
the Basel Committee is deemed to be authorized. However, there is a 
tendency that banks are likely to comply with the regulatory requirement 
minimally. In practice, banks cannot ignore the regulator and its 
regulation without serious repercussion, but often do ignore academic 
research. Likewise, the regulator attempts to look to its resources and 
thinks in the name of research to regulate the banks. Typically, banks and 
the regulator design, develop and publish their regulatory framework 
first, then leave to the academic researchers to access and influence the 
framework proposed by publishing in academic articles. The lack of 
connection between the academic researchers with banks and the 
regulator in nature and the design of a strong regulatory framework is a 
good illustration of the differences in interests highlighted previously. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine these different objectives by carrying 
out an empirical investigation on the extent of, and the type of, and the 
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 importance of VaR as a market risk measure across academic literature 
and banking practices. 
The emphasis on the definitions of ‘risk’, ‘market risk’, and ‘volatility’ is 
important and needs clarification before proceeding. 
Risk could be roughly explained as an uncertainty of the changes of future 
returns, such that the greater is the uncertainty, the greater is the risk. 
Market risk represents the uncertainty of the future returns due to 
changes in market conditions. The direct impact of market risk is that 
adverse changes in market conditions may result in severe losses. 
However, volatility is not the same as risk. Financial markets often display 
high levels of volatility, which is reflected in the pricing of financial assets. 
Volatility can be characterized as the conditional variance of the 
underlying asset returns (see Tsay 2010, 109). This volatility evolves over 
time in a continuous manner and has many other financial applications. 
It also plays a significant role in the portfolio selection under the mean-
variance analysis (Markowitz 1959, 1991). Volatility may be high for 
certain periods and low for other periods. However, volatility is not 
directly observable. Statistically, volatility is often stationary, and it does 
not diverge to infinity (see Poon and Granger 2003). In this thesis, the 
term ‘volatility’ is used loosely in a descriptive sense rather than the 
precise notion often implied in financial econometrics. 
Since Basel I was first introduced in 1988, followed by the 1996 
amendment of the Basel Capital Accord to apply minimum capital 
requirements for market risk, Value-at-Risk (VaR) is becoming an 
internationally accepted risk measure for the banking industry to manage 
market risk, capital adequacy and regulatory reporting. VaR is described 
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 as a procedure to measure the probability of maximum loss over a target 
horizon within a given confidence level (Jorion 1996, 2007). In particular, 
each bank has to set aside an amount of risk capital of at least three times 
that of VaR. The Basel Accord allows banks to design their own internal 
VaR models to determine their regulatory capital requirements for 
market risk. On one hand, banks must consider how much risk they are 
taking, and whether they have enough capital to cover for that risk. On 
the other hand, the regulator is concerned with whether banks have set 
aside sufficient capital to meet large unexpected losses in the event of 
financial market distress. The recent financial events, particularly the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), have led to a great deal of attention to 
providing more sophisticated and statistically justifiable VaR models. 
During the crisis, many international banks not only experienced a sharp 
increase in the level of VaR but also faced higher regulatory capital 
charges.  
This thesis aims to demonstrate the differences in approaches and 
objectives to VaR modelling and forecasting by academic researchers and 
the practitioners. In theory, more complex VaR models may be preferred 
by academic researchers for risk forecasting as these models capture 
volatility structures of asset returns that are usually not directly 
observable. However, these models raise some difficulties in practice. 
For a bank which trades large and complex portfolios of financial assets 
and derivatives daily, these models require continuous constructing and 
updating new volatility forecasts that come with high transaction costs. 
Therefore, combining these different objectives is crucial to developing a 
more practical approach that can satisfy both the literature and 
regulatory objectives. This thesis proposes developing more appropriate 
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 models that may assist banks and the regulator to calculate capital 
charges as a protection against market risk. 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, provides the necessary background and 
motivation of the study. It also explains in further detail the contributions 
of the following chapters into the literature. 
Chapter 2 begins with some background on the banking system in 
Australia and critically reviews the impact of the Basel Accord in 
Australian ADIs over time. This chapter examines the extent to which 
Basel III had been implemented in Australian banking system and if new 
aspects in the treatment of market risk are adopted in Basel III. The 
chapter also investigates the precision of VaR models to measuring 
market risk and the regulatory role played by Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) in supervising these ADIs. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has continued to improve 
the quality of worldwide banking supervision since the introduction of 
Basel I in 1988. Subsequently, Basel II was introduced in 2004, and Basel 
III in 2010 (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014a). Under 
Basel II and III, a new set of capital requirement is introduced to allow 
banks to manage their liquidity more prudently. This chapter evaluates 
the regulatory framework proposed by the Basel Accord and highlights 
any deficiencies that may exist and suggests ways in which such 
deficiencies may be addressed to promote higher quality and efficient 
banking system. 
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 In Australia, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the 
prudential regulator for Australian financial services industry and is 
responsible for the supervision of all Australian ADIs including banks, 
building societies, credit unions and specialist institutions. The Banking 
Act 1959 has allowed APRA to implement prudential standards on 
Australian ADIs to enforce relevant regulation and to act in the interests 
of depositors. This chapter analyses the existing prudential standards in 
the Australian ADIs. This includes an investigation of the precision of VaR 
models to measuring market risk and the role played by APRA in 
regulating these ADIs. It also discusses some crucial facts of VaR 
implementation and its potential significance to Australian ADIs.  
Chapter 2 provides the first empirical comparison of the impact of model 
specifications in estimating tail index and VaR. A consistent estimator of 
the tail index for the asymmetric extension of Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GJR-GARCH) error by 
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) is proposed as an alternate 
method to forecast VaR. The chapter then applies the proposed 
estimator to forecast VaR for a portfolio of AUD with twelve other 
currencies. It also investigates the performance of the two conditional 
volatility models under two different distributional assumptions, namely 
normal distribution and student-t distribution. The empirical results 
suggest that the proposed method performs well against the more 
traditional approaches based on conditional and unconditional variances.  
Given that the regulator prefers banks to use VaR models that display 
appropriate statistical properties, the performance of these models is 
evaluated by some statistical tests to assess the quality of VaR forecasts. 
The tests include Kupiec (1995) Test Until the First Failure (TUFF), 
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 followed by Christoffersen (1998) and Christoffersen, Hahn, and Inoue 
(2001) Serial Independence (IND) and Conditional Coverage (CC) tests. 
Also, the performance of VaR forecasts is evaluated by the backtesting 
procedures required by the Basel Committee. Backtesting procedures 
are where the actual returns are compared with VaR forecasts to assess 
the quality of banks’ internal model. This has an important implication 
for banks and the regulator. If banks are conservative in estimating 
market risk by reporting a lower VaR, the amount of capital charges that 
a bank holds will be higher. A higher capital charge will have a direct 
impact on the bank’s profitability. On the other hand, the regulator is 
concerned with minimizing the risk of default that may be due to large 
unexpected losses in the event of financial distress such as the GFC. If 
banks use VaR models that display the correct statistical properties, the 
chance to which they go into default is minimal.   
Models of time-varying volatility can be used to forecast VaR for the 
purpose of financial risk management. Many researchers believe that by 
incorporating time-varying volatility in VaR models may provide early 
warnings of changing market conditions. These models provide volatility 
estimates of asset returns that are usually not directly observable.  
Chapter 4 analyses the importance of accommodating time-varying 
conditional correlations in forecasting VaR. The performance of VaR 
forecasts produced by Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model of 
Bollerslev (1990) is compared with the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC) model of Engle (2002) and the Time-Varying Conditional 
Correlation (TVC) model of Tse and Tsui (2002). These models are chosen 
as they entail a more manageable and parsimonious multivariate 
volatility forecasting model. The chapter then applies these models to 
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 forecast VaR for a portfolio of AUD with twelve other currencies. Some 
statistical tests and the backtesting procedures required by the Basel 
Committee are conducted to evaluate the performance of VaR forecasts. 
Incorporating time-varying volatility in VaR models is not straightforward. 
Notice that these models raise some difficulties in practice, where banks 
are to trade with relatively large and complex portfolios that are unlikely 
to change daily. This implies that each day, the banks will have to 
compute a series of historical data for the new portfolios to estimate VaR. 
Consequently, this may create additional costs to the banks. Instead of 
using these models, banks appear to be taking less computationally 
demanding alternatives. Banks prefer to use a simple VaR measure that 
aggregates all of the risks of a trading portfolio into a single number, 
which is suitable for use in the boardroom, reporting to the regulator and 
disclosure in their financial reports. 
Chapter 5 examines the adequacy of reported VaR forecasts for 
Australian ADIs. This chapter focuses on whether the reported VaR 
forecasts provide any new information to investors and the bank 
regulators to assessing the differences in market risk exposures for each 
ADI. The chapter uses a series of published data in electronic form, 
provided by APRA under the APRA Research Grant Program (the 
Program)1. This dataset contains the reported quarterly VaR forecasts 
from nine Australian ADIs from the year of 2008 to 2010. This study 
1 The agreement of confidentiality for undertaking the Program is committed where APRA requires 
the Recipient(s) to preserve and maintain the confidentiality of information and documents (see 
Appendix I). This dataset is subjected to the secrecy provisions of Section 56 of the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (the Act). To comply with this requirement, the Recipient(s) 
has applied and obtained ethics approval from Curtin Human Research Ethics Committee for the 
Program (see Appendix II). Access to data are limited only to the Recipient(s) of the Program, Thesis 
Committee and APRA. 
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 follows the approach as proposed in Jorion (2002) and examines the 
relationship between the reported VaR forecasts with ADIs’ future 
operating revenues in a simple linear regression framework. One of the 
main objectives for Basel III is to strengthen banks’ transparency and 
disclosures. The findings in Chapter 5 suggest the current financial 
reporting environment in Australia does not provide academic 
researchers and the regulator enough information to assess the quality 
of VaR forecasts reported by ADIs. It is worth noting that the 
requirements for banks to disclose information more completely can 
sometimes be very costly and may not necessary increase transparency. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and discusses further work for 
future research. 
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RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN AUSTRALIAN 
AUTHORIZED DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS (ADIS) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision aims to improve the quality 
of worldwide banking supervision under the Basel Framework. Following 
the collapse of Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the default of the 
German Bank Herstatt in 1974, the Basel Committee has set minimum 
standards for the regulation and supervision of international banks. The 
first Basel Accord was introduced in 1988 where a minimum capital ratio 
of 8 percent to total risk-weighted assets was set, followed by the 1996 
Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord to include market risk. The Basel 
Framework is periodically revised, highlighting the constant need for 
establishing more prudent capital requirements to strengthen the 
international banking system and improve market confidence in 
regulation. Subsequently, Basel II was introduced in 2004, and Basel III in 
2010 (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014a).  
Since 1998, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the 
prudential regulator and supervisor of all Australian authorized deposit-
taking institutions (ADIs), including banks, building societies, credit 
unions, and specialist institutions. The Banking Act 1959 has allowed 
APRA to implement prudential standards on ADIs, to enforce the relevant 
regulation, and to act in the interests of depositors, insurance policy 
Page | 10  
 
 holders, and other members. The purpose is to promote the stability and 
market confidence in the Australian financial system (Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority 2011a, 2011b). APRA has played a sound 
supervisory role in implementing Basel II from 1 January 2008, and the 
Basel III from 1 January 2013 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2014e).  
Under Basel III, a new set of capital requirements was introduced to allow 
international banks to manage their risk exposure more prudently. To 
ensure sufficient capital reserves against large unexpected losses in 
banks’ trading portfolios of financial assets and derivatives, the 
prudential regulation of minimum capital requirements is used. 
Minimum capital requirements are designed to mitigate the 
Government’s role as the lender of last resort. Hence, by requiring the 
banks to set aside an amount of capital, there is reduced financial burden 
borne by the Government. In particular, the total capital ratio to risk-
weighted assets is maintained at 8 percent with at least 6 percent in Tier 
1 capital and 2 percent in Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital or ‘core’ capital 
consists of equity and disclosed reserves from after-tax retained earnings. 
Tier 2 capital or ‘supplementary’ capital consists of undisclosed reserves, 
revaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, perpetual securities, 
and subordinated debt with more than five years maturity. While, banks 
must hold at least 4.5 percent of the common equity in their total risk-
weighted assets. These ratios are phasing in gradually from the beginning 
of 2013 and becoming fully effective by 1 January 2019 (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision 2011a). In Australia, the proportion of common 
equity in ADIs’ total risk-weighted assets had increased from 7.5 percent 
to 9.1 percent, and the total capital ratio had increased from 11.5 percent 
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 to 12.5 percent, from December 2008 to December 20142. These ratios 
show that ADIs have strengthened their capital positions considerably in 
the last eight years. It also highlights the fact that ADIs are holding larger 
proportions of common equity in their trading portfolios of financial 
assets and derivatives. Such exposure means that ADIs are becoming 
increasingly subject to market risk. APRA (2014a) claimed that ADIs 
particularly Australian banks have consistently held capital well above 
the minimum requirements since Basel I. APRA has continuously taken a 
more conservative approach to capital than the minimum requirements 
and that it becomes an important contributing factor to mitigate against 
the GFC of 2008.  
The GFC reviewed that many international banks had built up excessive 
leverage and had a capital level that was inadequate to withstand 
unexpected losses without becoming insolvent. As part of Basel III, banks 
are also be required to maintain a non-risk-based leverage ratio of 3 
percent on Tier 1 capital. This ratio measures the size of banks’ Tier 1 
capital relative to their total on- and off-balance sheet exposures. A 
bank’s total exposure measure includes on-balance sheet exposures, 
derivative exposures, securities financing transaction exposures, and off-
balance sheet items (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014b). 
The leverage ratio is measured by two liquidity standards, namely 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). LCR 
is the ratio of highly liquid assets to net cash flows over a 30-day period. 
This ratio ensures that the banks will have current assets such as cash to 
withstand short-term liquidity disruptions. While, NSFR is the ratio of 
2 Data obtained from Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2015. “Statistics: Quarterly 
Authorized Deposit-taking Institution Performance." 
http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/Publications/Pages/adi-quarterly-performance-statistics.aspx 
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 longer-term funding such as deposits or wholesale funding to banks’ 
asset holdings. Banks will have to meet these standards by repositioning 
their capital level to make them less vulnerable to unexpected shocks. If 
the capital levels are too low, banks may be unable to absorb high levels 
of losses. Excessively low levels of capital increase the risk of bank failures, 
which in turn, may put depositors’ funds at risk.  The introduction of a 
leverage ratio in Tier 1 capital is a step forward in Basel III. However, the 
effectiveness of leverage ratio in detecting the probability of financial 
default is yet to be empirically supported. Hlatshwayo et al. (2013) found 
that a higher LCR ratio is usually associated with a higher rate of 
bankruptcy. Also, it is not clear as to how LCR and NSFR ratios can be 
merged to the total capital ratio to risk-weighted assets (Moosa and 
Burns 2013). The implementation of leverage ratio will be reviewed in 
2017 and gradually calibrated into Pillar 1 (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2014a). 
This leads to the central issue of this chapter. Since Basel I was first 
introduced in 1988, followed by the 1996 amendment of the Basel 
Capital Accord to apply minimum capital requirements for market risk, 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) has become a standard market risk measure for many 
international banks including Australian banks. In particular, each bank 
has to set aside an amount of capital of at least three times that of VaR. 
The original amendment required ADIs to adopt a standardized approach 
when calculating the risk capital. The standardized approach assigns a 
common risk factor for each type of risk exposure, including interest rate 
risk, equity risk, foreign exchange risk and commodity risk. The amount 
of capital is calculated by the arithmetic sum of each risk factor. However, 
this attracted great criticism from the international community for its 
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 inability to capture highly adverse conditions in the financial market. 
Furthermore, the standardized approach does not allow banks to 
disintegrate and analyse the risk of their trading portfolios separately 
(Soczo 2002). A series of unpredicted financial events that caused 
significant financial losses suggested that the necessity of establishing 
robust VaR techniques to manage banks’ exposure to market risk is 
critical. In response to the criticism, the Basel Accord was amended to 
allow banks to design their VaR models, provided these met some 
regulatory criteria. The Basel Committee also required banks to perform 
a series of backtesting procedures to test and improve the accuracy of 
their models for measuring market risk. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide an overview of the regulatory changes on Basel III with an 
emphasis on the influence of these regulations on market risk exposure.  
The plan of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
background of the Basel Accord in the Australian banking system. It 
outlines the limitations with current regulations and discusses how they 
may be addressed by the new proposals from the Basel Committee. 
Section 2.3 describes the use of VaR as a standard market risk measure 
to the regulatory process. It also provides the theoretical framework for 
VaR measures. Section 2.4 describes the backtesting procedures that are 
used by the Basel Accord to validate a VaR model. Banks may have a 
tendency to provide conservative VaR forecasts. Conservative VaR 
forecasts lead to a greater number of violations than reasonably 
expected given a confidence level. Subsequently, a penalty charge that is 
a function of the number of violations on the previous 250 trading days 
is imposed. The structure and impact of these penalty charges on banks 
are also discussed. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.  
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 2.2 BACKGROUND OF THE BASEL ACCORD IN THE AUSTRALIAN BANKING 
SYSTEM 
Since the 1980s, Australian banks have experienced several major 
merger and acquisitions, which has led to the privatisation of large 
Australian banks including Commonwealth Bank in the early 1990s 
(Wright 1999). Deregulation has led to a more conservative business 
approach by the Australian banking sector, considering possible adversity 
in global financial markets. In contrast to major international banks in 
other countries, Australian banks performed relatively strongly during 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (see Figure 2.1). The Australian four pillar 
banks, Commonwealth Bank, Westpac Banking Corporation, Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group and National Australia Bank, had proven 
to be more resilient to the impact of the GFC. They were ranked among 
the world’s top 20 safest banks in 2009 (see Keeler 2009) and continued 
to hold this position in 2014 (see Fiano 2014).  
Figure 2.1 3  shows the impact of GFC on selected major banks from 
different countries relative to the Australian major banks. It can be seen 
that Australian banks have continuously generated the highest 
percentage of pre-tax profits to total assets relative to their peers in 
other countries during the GFC in 2008. In particular, the Australian 
major banks showed the highest pre-tax profits of 0.99 percent to total 
assets, followed by Canada at 0.45 percent and the US at 0.28 percent. 
In contrast, the major banks in Switzerland reported the pre-tax losses of 
1.75 percent to total assets. Similarly, the major banks in Germany, Japan, 
3 Data obtained from the annual reports of Bank for International Settlements. “Profitability of Major 
Banks from Bank for International Settlements.” http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
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 and the United Kingdom also reported the pre-tax losses of 0.45 percent, 
0.16 percent and 0.05 percent to total assets, respectively. This could be 
because Australian banks benefited from a strong global demand for 
commodity products and an appreciating Australian dollar (International 
Monetary Fund 2012). Likewise, the banking system in Australia is highly 
concentrated and had been re-regulated before the GFC (Davis 2007). 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) claimed that the relatively strong 
performance of Australian banks was a consequence of prudent 
regulation and tighter lending standards compared to those in the US 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2009). Overall, there were 167 ADIs in 
Australia with total assets amounting to AUD4.15 trillion in September 
2014, with the four pillar banks contributing 78.2 percent, i.e. AUD3.25 
trillion, of the total assets4.  
4 Data obtained from Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2015. “Monthly Banking Statistics." 
http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/Publications/Pages/monthly-banking-statistics.aspx 
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 Figure 2.1 Pre-tax Profits of Major Banks (% of Total Assets) 
 
When Basel I was introduced in 1988, one of the main problems 
highlighted was the requirement of a minimum 8 percent capital ratio on 
risk-weighted assets for credit risk only. Credit risk arises from an inability 
or unwillingness by borrowers to meet their obligations to an institution, 
such as repaying a loan (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
2011c). While there was no capital requirement for market risk, the 
regulator soon realized that banks were not providing sufficient amount 
of capital to absorb large unexpected trading losses for excessive market 
risk and moved to rectify this issue. And so, Basel I was amended in 1996, 
requiring banks to apply minimum capital requirements for market risk. 
The Basel Accord defines market risk as the “risk of loss in on- and off-
balance sheet positions arising from movements in market prices” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 1996, 1). The four market risks 
identified in the Basel Accord included interest rate risk, equity risk, 
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 foreign exchange risk and commodity risk. The prudential regulation of 
market risk requires banks to hold at least three times that of VaR as a 
risk capital to mitigate against large unexpected trading losses. The 
market risk capital requirements comprise of two separate charges, i.e. 
‘specific risk’ and ‘general market risk’. Specific risk is the “risk that the 
value of a security will change due to issuer-specific factors” regardless 
of whether it is short or long position and general market risk is the “risk 
of loss due to the changes in market interest rates” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 1996, 9).  
Market risk is measured by Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR is described as a 
procedure to measure the probability of maximum loss over a target 
horizon within a given confidence level (Jorion 1996, 2007). For example, 
an Australian bank holds a trading portfolio with the daily VaR of AUD 3 
million at 99 percent confidence level. It can be interpreted as there is 
one percent chance that a loss is exceeding AUD 3 million for the next 
day. So, the bank has to hold at least AUD 9 million as risk capital over 
the next day. J.P. Morgan introduced the RiskMetrics method to calculate 
VaR (see RiskMetrics Group 1996). They argued that this method reduces 
computational burdens in measuring market risk and can be used for any 
asset in a bank’s trading portfolio. Since then, the use of more 
sophisticated and complex VaR models in banks has escalated. The 
techniques of calculating VaR and their criticisms are discussed in Section 
2.3.  
As set out in Basel III, banks are required to follow a standardized 
approach to measuring each of the four market risk identified above. The 
standardized approach was set by the original 1996 Basel Capital Accord. 
It is acknowledged that the “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be 
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 adequate to capture the risks inherent in large and complex trading and 
derivative portfolios (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2013). 
Hence, an internal models approach is introduced to the banks with large 
and complex trading and derivative portfolios. The use of internal models 
allows banks to set capital charges that closely conform to their actual 
market risk exposures. The internal models incorporate two criteria, 
namely qualitative and quantitative standards. The qualitative standards 
include the appointment of an independent risk control unit to regulate 
day-to-day risk management process. The board of directors and senior 
managers should be actively involved in the risk controlling process. The 
unit is also responsible for conducting a rigorous and comprehensive 
stress-testing programme on the bank’s trading positions daily. Most 
importantly, the bank’s internal risk measurement model must be fully 
integrated with other risk management systems. An independent review 
of the bank’s risk measurement system should also be carried out 
regularly for audit and control purposes. Quantitative standards involve 
the specification on estimating day-to-day VaR model, and the risk 
assessment for large and complex portfolios. Banks are to calculate the 
VaR on a daily basis with 99 percent of confidence level and report the 
VaR over a 10-day holding period. The standards also require banks to 
describe the backtesting procedures that are used to validate a VaR 
model and the impact of backtesting results to daily capital charges. The 
procedures for backtesting are presented in Section 2.4. Other 
requirements include the need for frequently updating the bank’s 
datasets and a minimum length of the historical observation period. A 
detailed description of the qualitative and quantitative standards is 
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 available from the report of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2011a). 
To date, the Australian four pillar banks have adopted the internal 
models approach. Basel III has allowed these banks to design and 
implement their own procedures, within the approval of APRA, in 
measuring and managing their risk (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2014e). It is worth noting that the internal models approach 
is hard to monitor and usually expensive to administer. However, the use 
of internal models can provide unintended incentives to banks to 
underestimate minimum capital requirements. 
Recent research has been attempted to assess the specification of the 
internal models approach and the extent to which the approach is 
operated in Australian ADIs. In particular, Rutkowski and Tarca (2014) 
explored the implementation of the internal models approach in 
Australian major banks to assess the adequacy of capital requirements 
relative to credit risk. Their findings were limited by the access of internal 
bank datasets that are highly confidential and not publically available. 
Hence, they adopted a practical modification using readily available data 
to evaluate the model specification of the internal models approach 
implemented by Australian major banks. Their results supported the 
notion that the Australian banking system was able to withstand severe 
shocks during the GFC, although some banks fell below the minimum 
threshold of capital requirements. They complimented APRA for its 
efforts in protecting the Australian banking sector against bankruptcy. 
They also suggested that a higher capital requirement is desirable to 
improve the stability of the financial system in Australia. In a recent Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2014c) report, the internal models 
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 approach adopted by Australian ADIs had been described to be 
substantively in line with the Basel Accord. However, Moosa and Burns 
(2013) argued that the regulatory capital requirements under Basel III 
will not make Australian ADIs more resilient against the future financial 
crisis. They claimed that the probability of future financial crisis occurring 
and the severity of its consequences could not be reduced by merely 
imposing a greater amount of capital charges. Hence, they questioned as 
to whether the proposed regulatory changes in Basel III contribute to 
better risk management practice for Australian ADIs, or it is merely a 
compliance exercise. 
Under Basel II, the emphasis on the accuracy of risk assessment relies on 
a three-pillar structure, namely minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review process, and market discipline (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2006). The structure was revised in the Basel III 
when major international banks suffered large unexpected trading losses 
from the subsequent crises in the financial market. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
the three-pillar structure of Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2006, 2011a). Pillar 1 was a direct replacement of Basel I and 
requires banks to assess their regulatory capital requirements for the 
market, credit, and operational risk. This is to allow banks to determine 
the amount of capital requirements more adequately based on data and 
formal techniques to reduce regulatory arbitrary. 
 
 
 
 
Page | 21  
 
 Figure 2.2 Structure of Basel III  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from market risk as explained above, credit risk has been 
implemented to account for the probability of default in contractual 
obligations such as loans on a bank’s lending book. If borrowers failed to 
repay their loans, a bank might experience credit losses. These credit 
losses will reduce a bank’s profitability and affect a bank’s capital ratio. 
A comprehensive study on the Australian banks’ large credit losses was 
conducted by Rodgers (2015) over two decades from 1980 to 2013. The 
large credit losses in Australia can be categorized into two episodes. One 
was the credit losses around the early 1990s recession, and the other was 
during and after the GFC. His findings showed that the Australian banks’ 
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 large credit losses appear to closely related to large unexpected trading 
losses for excessive market risk during both episodes. Likewise, Allen and 
Powell (2012) showed that Australian banks’ credit risk increased 
dramatically during the GFC.  
One of the problems with the Basel I was that it focused on credit risk at 
the expense of the Australian banks’ total risk (Hogan and Sharpe 1990). 
At the same time, the classification of credit risk also encouraged banks 
to transfer their risky assets off their balance sheets through 
securitization. As a result, banks were not holding sufficient amount of 
capital against risky assets (Santos 2001). Under Basel III, three methods 
are introduced in measuring the credit risk capital requirements, namely, 
the use of credit-ratings by external credit-rating agencies (the 
Standardized Approach); Foundation Internal Ratings Basis (FIRB) on the 
probability of loan default; and Advanced Internal Ratings Basis (AIRB) on 
loss given default (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011a). FIRB 
and AIRB allow banks to assess credit risk capital requirements based on 
their credit exposures and internal credit-ratings on different asset 
classes. The Basel Committee is continually seeking to improve the 
design of the Standardized Approach for credit risk (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2014f). A several key aspects were proposed, 
including reduced the reliance on the use of external credit-ratings, 
increased credit risk sensitivity, increased comparability of capital 
requirements between banks using the standardized approach and the 
internal ratings-based approach and better clarity on the application of 
the standards. 
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 Operational risk arises due to human acts of fraud and technical errors in 
a bank’s day-to-day business activities, processes, and system (Gregoriou 
2009). The initial work related to operational risk was carried out by the 
Basel Committee in 1998 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1998). 
Later, operational risk was included in Basel II. A famous example of 
operational risk in practice is Nick Leeson, the rogue trader who brought 
down Barings Bank in February 1995 (Power 2005). Similarly, one of the 
most notorious events in Australian banking history was the large trading 
losses of AUD360 million incurred by the National Australia Bank (NAB) 
in January 2004. The losses occurred due to an increase of risk-taking in 
large and complex foreign currency options portfolio combined with the 
adverse expectation of currency movements. The traders were aware 
that the trading losses had been incurred and concealed losses by 
entering into false transactions (Hamer and Rivett 2004). As a result, 
APRA was called to investigate and review the circumstances associated 
with the trading losses. The investigation revealed that the losses were 
caused by the negligence of the Board and inadequacies in risk 
management systems. The investigation had led to the improvement in 
the design and implementation of NAB’s risk management framework 
(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2004). Moosa and Silvapulle 
(2012) conducted a study of 54 operational loss events for 8 Australian 
banks during the period from 1990 to 2007. Their findings showed that 
operational losses would have a great negative impact on the banks’ 
market values.  
Operational risk has been treated as identical to market and credit risk 
where banks are required to set a minimum capital charge to cover for 
operational risk. Three methods are introduced to measure operational 
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 risk capital requirements, including Basic Indicator Approach (BIS); 
Standardized Approach (TSA); and Advanced Measurement Approach 
(AMA) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b). A bank may use 
one of the above approaches to measuring their operational risk. The 
simplest method is the BIA by which the capital charge is calculated as a 
percentage of gross income, a proxy for operational risk exposure, at 15%. 
This method does not require the supervisory approval. Under the AMA, 
a bank is allowed to develop its own internal models to calculate the 
capital requirements for operational risk. The minimum capital ratio for 
a typical AMA bank is set at 10.8% of its gross income. This method 
involves a rigorous risk management framework and subjects to the 
supervisory approval. Whereas, the TSA requires banks to divide their 
total gross income into eight different business lines, including corporate 
finance, trading and sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment 
and settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage. 
The capital charges are calculated as a sum of the products of the gross 
income for each business line and a specific regulatory coefficient, known 
as beta, is assigned to each line. The use of TSA requires compliance with 
a set of qualitative criteria relating to operational risk management 
systems, and banks are required to obtain approval from the supervisory 
authority. A variant of the TSA, the Alternative Standardized Approach 
(ASA) allows banks with high interest margins to calculate their 
operational risk capital requirements by replacing the gross income for 
two business lines, retail banking, and commercial banking, with a fixed 
percentage of their loans and advances. In 2014, the Basel Committee 
proposed revisions to the TSA for measuring operational risk capital 
requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014d). The 
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 revised TSA would replace the existing approaches, BIA, and TSA, 
including its variant the ASA. The Business Indicator (BI) would be used 
to replace gross income in determining operational risk capital 
requirements. BI consists of three major components, interest, service, 
and financial components. The use of BI was proposed on the basis that 
it has a greater predictive power to capture a bank’s business volume, 
hence more sensitive to operational risk. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (2010) report, Australian ADIs have been accredited as a 
low operational risk. This is due to vigilant political stability, well-
regulated legal system, low security risk, steady economic growth and 
international trades. 
Pillar 2 of Basel III focuses on the role of supervisors in evaluating each 
bank’s overall risk exposure and assesses the regulatory capital 
requirements against additional risk. Supervisors are allowed to seek 
clarification from banks and propose immediate actions to prevent 
capital from falling below the minimum levels. The primary objective is 
to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system. In Australia, APRA is responsible on ensuring the compliance with 
all regulatory requirements as set by the Basel Accord. Despite the 
increasing capital requirements resulting from the GFC, the Australian 
banking system continues to exhibit high performance apart from capital 
pressures due to global liquidity contraction (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority 2007a, 2007b). Arguably, APRA has played a sound 
supervisory role in enforcing Basel III requirements and has built robust 
regulatory and supervisory guidelines by promoting a well-capitalized 
banking system in the current financial environment. However, it is 
important to recognize that the APRA’s effectiveness as a prudential 
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 regulator for dealing with financial distressed ADIs depends on having a 
clear mandatory and operational independence, a strong prudential 
framework, an active risk management programme, and adequate 
staffing and financial resources to meet its statutory objectives 
(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014b). 
As a response to the extreme events over the past decades, the Basel 
Committee has undertaken desperate measures in requiring banks to 
disclose comprehensive capital guidelines in their trading books. Under 
Basel II, Pillar 3 - Market Discipline, was introduced as a supervisory and 
regulatory tool for monitoring and controlling banking risk. Subsequently, 
new disclosure requirements were greatly increased in Basel III. Pillar 3 
seeks to promote market discipline through the public disclosure of every 
detail of each bank’s regulatory capital requirements. In particular, Pillar 
3 requires banks to report the nature, frequency and types of risk 
exposure including market, credit, operational risk. It also outlines 
general and specific disclosure requirements on the banks’ trading books. 
The disclosure as suggested in Pillar 3 can be extensive such that the 
implementation of internal models by banks to accurately capturing the 
regulatory capital requirements can be onerous and sometimes costly to 
administer. 
Given that banks are allowed by the Basel Accord to design their own VaR 
models, the extent to which VaR models are reported, and the accuracy 
of reported VaR measures raise some concerns to the regulator. Hirtle 
(2003) found that the market risk capital charges provide useful 
information about banks’ future trading risk. An earlier study by Jorion 
(2002) analysed the informativeness of quarterly VaR forecasts disclosed 
in the financial reports of 8 major banks in the US. He showed that VaR 
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 measures appear to be useful in forecasting the variability of banks’ next 
quarter trading revenues. Liu, Ryan, and Tan (2004) examined the 
technical complication on VaR models across 17 banks in the US. 
Consistent with Jorion (2002), they stated that banks with better 
information and complex VaR models are informative in predicting banks’ 
future trading risk. A study by Pérignon and Smith (2010a), using a 
sample of 60 large US and international banks, argued that banks provide 
very little useful information about banks’ future trading risk. 
Consequently, they commented that the level and quality to which VaR 
measures is disclosed is indifferent to the regulator.  
In Australia, APRA is responsible for collecting data for its own purposes 
and acts as a national statistical agency for the financial sector, collecting 
data on behalf of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. ADIs are required to follow the prudential standard 
as set by APRA, particular on capital adequacy on public disclosure and 
market risk (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2013a, 2013b, 
2013c). Most of the ADIs in Australia do report their VaR forecasts in their 
financial reports; however only a small number of ADIs provide detail 
information about their risk models and measurement results. Instead of 
presenting their risk positions on each of the components of market risk, 
ADIs frequently present only a general discussion of their overall trading 
risk in their reports. Perhaps, due to the confidentiality and loss of 
competitive advantage, ADIs may be unwilling to disclose complete 
information that potentially unveil their weaknesses and improprieties 
to other competitors in the same industry. In spite these criticisms, APRA 
completed the implementation of Basel III disclosure requirements in 
2013, and the level of public disclosures by Australian ADIs was regarded 
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 as satisfactory by the Basel Committee (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2014e).  
It is worth noting that the requirements for banks to disclose information 
more completely can sometimes be very costly and may not necessary 
increase transparency. The content and format of disclosure and the 
need to manipulate numerical data to make it more meaningful may 
hinder the purpose of VaR disclosure. In some instances, banks may 
report only quarterly instead of daily VaR numbers. Some banks are more 
forthcoming and include daily time-series plots for their trading risk and 
revenues. Establishing the requirements for VaR disclosure alone cannot 
ensure an efficient and robust banking system.  However, combined with 
other forms of efforts including the role of supervising authorities in 
assessing and validating VaR models may reinforce regulatory exertions 
to improve the current banking system.  
2.3 WHAT IS VALUE-AT-RISK (VAR), AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 
According to Frey and McNeil (2002), VaR is defined as follows: 
Let 
LF  denote the distribution of loss L  such that ( ) ( )LF l P L l= ≤ . Given 
some confidence level (0,1)α ∈ , the VaR of a portfolio is given by the 
smallest number l  such that the probability that the loss L  exceeds l is 
no larger than α . Formally, 
{ }sup , ( )VaR l P L lα α= ∈ < ≤   
Alternatively, VaRα  can be defined as the lower -quantile of the loss 
distribution
LF . Then, VaRα can be computed using the quantile function
1
LF − . 
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 1( ) LLVaR F qα αα−= =    
where Lqα  is the lower α -quantile of the loss distribution of asset returns 
of a portfolio. Typically, α is set at 0.01. 
Under current regulations, banks are required to calculate VaR on a daily 
basis at 99 percent confidence level, i.e. 0.01α = , and report VaR over a 
10-day holding period. Based on the square-root-of-time rule, the 10-day 
VaR can be represented through 1-day VaR at 
10 -  10   1-  day VaR day VaRα α= ×  
This rule assumes that the daily returns are normal and iid. Banks are 
allowed to scale 1-day VaR to longer horizons depending on the liquidity 
of a bank’s trading portfolios. For example, a time horizon of 10 days will 
be used for a foreign currency portfolio while a time horizon of 120 days 
will be used for the credit spreads of an options portfolio. Typically, a 
bank rebalances its portfolios very frequently, and the assumption that 
the risk of a portfolio remains unchanged over a longer horizon is 
questionable. Hence, to extrapolate 1-day VaR to 250-day VaR using a 
square-root-of-time rule is meaningless. Similarly, the rule does not hold 
when the asset returns are modelled with a GARCH(1,1) process. Drost 
and Nijman (1993) derived the temporal aggregation for GARCH(1,1) 
processes and showed that GARCH(1,1) is not closed under temporal 
aggregation. The best approximation to h-day volatility is unlikely to 
produce similar parameters by aggregating the approximation to 1-day 
volatility. Hence, the square-root-of-time rule is inappropriate, and the 
scaling of time-varying volatility into longer horizon does not work. See 
also Christoffersen, Diebold, and Shuermann (1998) and Wang, Yeh, and 
Cheng (2011). The square-root-of-time rule is simple and easy to 
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 calculate, but it has some serious drawbacks. Nonetheless, the square-
root-of-time rule has been widely used and accepted by banks and the 
regulator. 
One of the biggest criticisms regarding the use of VaR is that it is not 
subadditive. Artzner et al. (1999) demonstrated that VaR fails 
subadditivity, i.e. a property that is desirable for a risk measure. 
Following the principle of diversification in modern portfolio theory, a 
subadditivity measure should reduce the risk for a diversified portfolio. 
Subadditivity can be illustrated by using a simple example. Consider two 
assets which returns are independent and identically distributed (iid). If 
VaR is homogeneity,  
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )VaR L VaR L VaR L Lα α α+ ≥ +   
However, Artzner et al. (1999) proved that VaR does not satisfy the 
subadditivity property since 
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )VaR L VaR L VaR L Lα α α+ < +   
The property of subadditivity is of particular importance for the regulator 
in unexpected events such as the GFC. The purpose of VaR is to calculate 
the amount of capital required to protect against unexpectedly large 
trading losses. Intuitively, if the regulator uses a non-subadditive risk 
measure in determining the regulatory capital needed, then banks have 
an incentive to use VaR to reduce their capital charges. Therefore, banks 
may not, in fact, have an adequate amount of capital to mitigate against 
unexpectedly large trading losses. The study by Basak and Shapiro (2001) 
supports this intuition, and they found that VaR risk managers who 
optimized their portfolios to minimize VaR may intentionally or 
unintentionally choose an allocation that is of larger exposure to risky 
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 assets than non-VaR risk managers. As a result, VaR risk managers 
consequently incur greater losses when unexpected adverse market 
events occur. By definition, VaR only represents one quantile of the profit 
and loss distribution and disregards the tail loss beyond the quantile (see 
Danıélsson 2002). An alternative method to calculate the conditional 
expectation of loss beyond VaR at a confidence level is the Expected 
Shortfall (ES) proposed by Artzner et al. (1999) and introduced by 
Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) as Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR). A 
more general definition of ES is given by Acerbi and Tasche (2002a, 
2002b). ES not only accounts for the severity of losses beyond VaR, but it 
is also a coherent risk measure that displays the property of subadditivity. 
These desirable properties have been shown by Artzner et al. (1999), 
Acerbi and Tasche (2002a, 2002b), and Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002).  
Despite the main criticism of VaR not having subadditivity, Garcia, 
Renault, and Tsafack (2007), Ibragimov (2009) and Daníelsson et al. (2013) 
found that VaR can be subadditive in circumstances when asset returns 
have a fatter tail distribution than the normal distribution. These studies 
showed that VaR violates subadditivity when assets are subjected to 
occasional very large returns and when the tails of distributions are super 
fat. In reality, asset returns are found to be non-normal and have been 
shown to produce fat tails in the return distributions (see, for example, 
Mandelbrot 1963, Fama 1965, Bollerslev 1987). Therefore, VaR is still 
relevant given that asset returns are moderately fat-tailed at the lower 
tail of the distribution and VaR displays subadditive property in these 
regions.  
Currently, a debate is going on whether the use of ES should be 
recommended in the future proposition of the Basel Framework. So far, 
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 VaR is still prescribed by the regulator because of its superior statistical 
performance and its simplicity in mathematical application. Yamai and 
Yoshiba (2005) found that VaR estimates are more accurate than ES 
estimates when the loss distributions have fat tails. A larger number of 
observations is required to reduce the estimation error of ES. Hence, ES 
is computationally more complex under fat-failed distribution. Intuitively, 
VaR models are statistically more stable than ES thus lead to a superior 
out-of-sample forecasting performance. Consequently, the quality of 
VaR models is easier to verify than ES.  
Theoretically, ES has some advantages over VaR models. In practice, 
banks and the regulator use VaR extensively, and its importance as a risk 
measure is, therefore, unlikely to diminish. From the perspective of 
industry practice, they are looking for a simple and robust risk measure. 
A notable survey conducted by EDHEC Risk-Institute for 229 financial 
institutions based in Europe in 2008 showed that VaR continued to be 
one of the most commonly used risk measures by the industry. However, 
the survey found that most of the risk managers failed to measure risk 
optimally due to lack of sufficient knowledge in VaR techniques. They 
ignored the fact that VaR primarily focuses on the tail of return 
distribution under the assumption that asset returns are normally 
distributed. Whereas, it is widely documented that the probability 
distribution of asset returns is fat-tailed. This means that the extreme 
price movements occur more often than normally predicted. After all, 
the choice of the best performing risk measure depends on the 
complexity of mathematical procedures and the stability of statistical 
assumptions. Hence, more advanced and sophisticated risk 
measurement methods are less likely to be used by the financial industry 
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 due to lack of practical applications and difficulties in assessing the 
quality of these models by the regulator.     
2.4 BACKTESTING 
The current regulatory framework requires banks that use their own 
internal risk models to calculate the VaR on a daily basis at 99 percent 
confidence level and report the VaR over a 10-day holding period. 
Backtesting procedures have been used to evaluate the performance of 
VaR models, where the actual returns are compared with the VaR 
forecasts to assess the quality of banks’ internal models. Specifically, the 
market risk capital charge is determined as the lower of either the bank’s 
current assessment of 99 percent VaR over the next 10 trading days or a 
multiple of the bank’s average reported 99 percent VaR over the previous 
60 trading days plus an additional amount that reflects the underlying 
market risk of the bank’s trading portfolios (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011a). 
According to the Basel Accord, banks are allowed to backtest their VaR 
models using actual or hypothetical profit and loss from their trading 
portfolios (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006). Hypothetical 
profit and loss for banks’ trading portfolios are calculated by applying the 
current day’s price movements to the previous day’s end-of-day 
portfolios. If banks are using the actual profit and loss of their trading 
portfolios, they must exclude fees, commissions, and net interest 
incomes, which are not directly related to market risk. Hypothetical 
backtesting may be more realistic, but it imposes substantial 
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 computational burdens given that the banks’ trading positions and the 
composition of their portfolios change daily. 
A violation is recorded when an actual loss on a portfolio exceeds the 
forecasted VaR. Banks using VaR models that lead to a significant number 
of violations are required to hold a higher level of capital charges. 
Subsequently, if they violate more than 1 percent in a financial year, they 
may be required to adopt the standardized approach (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision 2011a). The imposition of such penalty can be 
inappropriate as it affects banks’ profitability and exposes banks to high 
default risk. Particularly, in situations of severe market conditions. A 
large number of violations may signal that the bank is undergoing serious 
financial difficulties. Imposing a high penalty charge will add additional 
financial burdens to the bank (Lucas 2001). 
A procedure is used to calculate the number of times that the actual 
losses exceed VaR forecasts on the previous 250 trading days. Hence, 
,
,
1 if 
0 if 
t t
t
t t
L VaR
V
L VaR
α
α
>
=  ≤
                 (2.1) 
The total number of violations on the previous 250 trading days is 
calculated as: 
250
250
1
t t
t
V V
=
= ∑                    (2.2) 
The percentage of violations on the previous 250 trading days is given by: 
250250
1
1 t
T t
t
VV V
T T=
= =∑   where T = 250 in the Basel Accord           (2.3) 
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 Ideally, a good model will have a percentage of violation that is very close 
to one percent. 
0.01:  VaR model correctly forecasts market risk
0.01:  VaR model overesimates market risk
0.01:  VaR model underesimates market risk
T
T
T
V
V
V
=
<
>
  
The market risk capital charges (MRCC) on each bank must be set either 
at the lower VaR of the previous day, or the average reported 99 percent 
VaR over the previous 60 days trading days, multiplied by a scaling factor 
of (3+k) for a violation penalty. The scaling factor calculates the 
probability that a violation occurs for a given day over the previous 250 
trading days. Formally, it can be written as:   
    
60
, ,
1
1min , (3 )
60t t t ti
MRCC VaR k VaRα α
=
 
= + × 
 
∑               (2.4)
where, 
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                (2.5) 
A bank is categorized in the green zone if its VaR model is adequately 
accurate with no additional capital charge required. While, if a bank falls 
into the yellow zone, an additional capital charge will be imposed to 
justify the excessive number of violations. Finally, a bank is categorized 
in the red zone if its VaR model is not appropriate, and will be required 
to include a greater amount of capital charge. This penalty factor will only 
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 be reduced when the bank can demonstrate that there is an 
improvement made to its model.  
Pérignon, Deng, and Wang (2008) showed that banks are likely to be 
cautious when reporting their VaR forecasts. This could be due to the 
difficulties for banks to aggregate VaR forecasts across different business 
lines, or banks do not want to put their reputation at risk. Similarly, in the 
earlier study by Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) indicated that banks prefer 
to report high VaR forecasts to avoid the structural complication and the 
possibility of regulatory intervention in their risk models. If too many 
numbers of VaR violations are reported, a greater amount of penalty 
charges is imposed. The banks may be required to adopt the standardized 
approach for VaR estimation (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2011a). Lucas (2001) found that the current penalty structure is unlikely 
to provide a strong incentive for banks to design VaR models that provide 
good estimates to reflect their actual market risk exposure. It is profitable 
for banks to underreport their actual VaR forecasts. Consequently, da 
Veiga, Chan, and McAleer (2011) showed that a more severe penalty 
structure is probably desirable to discourage banks from choosing 
forecasting models that underestimate VaR. In particular, they proposed 
a new penalty structure that is based on the magnitude of violations 
instead of the current penalty structure that is based on the number of 
violations. An appropriate penalty structure may encourage banks to 
improve their risk models in forecasting VaR more precisely. Santos et al. 
(2012) proposed an alternative approach to determining the minimum 
capital requirements based on an optimal portfolio strategy. They 
applied Sharpe ratio to find the optimal weights of portfolios. By 
comparing the level of VaR forecasts and the number of VaR violations 
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 based on the optimal portfolio approach, a lower level of capital 
requirements can be achieved. 
Even though the Basel Accord does not require banks to test their VaR 
models statistically, some formal statistical procedures are desirable, and 
many tests are proposed in the academic literature. These tests reflect 
mostly the concerns of the regulator who prefers banks to use VaR 
models that display correct statistical properties. While, most statistical 
tests focus on the number of violations, they give a low power of testing 
(see, for example, Kupiec 1995). Other tests looking at the timing and 
magnitude of violations have demonstrated to be more useful (see, for 
example, Christoffersen, Hahn, and Inoue 2001). A detailed description 
of the techniques of the statistical tests is presented in Chapter 3. 
Ideally, banks should be able to report their VaR forecasts based on 
different models to minimize daily capital charges and to manage the 
number of violations strategically. In which case, banks can adopt 
different strategies depending on the current and future expectation of 
market conditions. In the study by McAleer, Jimenez-Martin, and Pérez-
Amaral (2010), they proposed an alternative decision rule that allows 
adjustment of the penalty structure based on the past period violations 
in calculating daily capital charges. They showed that during periods of 
adverse market conditions when the number of violations is expected to 
be high, a higher capital charge can be imposed to cover the worst 
possible loss. While, in periods of low market volatility, when the number 
of violations is expected to be small, banks are allowed to pay a lower 
capital charge. Hence, more funds can be invested in assets at a lower 
marginal cost to increase banks’ profitability.  
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 2.5 CONCLUSION 
The level of capital a bank holds indicates the future ability of the bank 
to grow, as well as its ability to withstand unexpected losses without 
becoming insolvent. The Basel Accord framework has undergone several 
revisions to address the inadequacy of minimum capital requirements to 
accommodate risk. The 1988 Basel Accord considered only the credit risk 
of bank assets and was not explicitly accounted for market and 
operational risk. Basel I was amended in 1996 to include market risk 
capital requirements given that banks were increasing exposed to market 
risk from their trading activities of financial assets and derivatives. This 
amendment is also allowed banks to use either the standardized 
approach or their own internal models to determine their regulatory 
capital requirement for market risk. This is to accommodate the original 
Basel Accord of “one-size-fits-all” approach which may not be adequate 
to capture the risks inherent in banks’ large and complex trading and 
derivative portfolios. Basel II was reformed in 2004 to improve the 
modelling approaches to risk management, particularly the regulatory 
capital requirement for operation risk. Basel II also established the 
supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and the role of disclosure and 
market discipline (Pillar 3). However, the GFC showed that many 
international banks had built up excessive leverage and had a capital 
level that was inadequate and of insufficient quality. Hence, the Basel II 
regulatory framework was revised as it was clear that there was an 
insufficient amount of capital held to withstand large unexpected trading 
losses. As a result, Basel III has extended the scope of its regulatory 
framework to accommodate more sophisticated risk factors in the 
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 current financial environment. Basel III considers new aspects of risk 
management, in particular, the responsibility of supervisory authority in 
monitoring and controlling the current risk management system in Pillar 
2 and the stringent disclosure requirements in Pillar 3 (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision 2011a). The framework also introduced a non-
risk-based leverage ratio with two liquidity standards, namely LCR and 
NSFR. These ratios are intended to strengthen banks’ short-term liquidity 
position and to ensure banks to maintain a stable funding level.  
While it is too soon to determine the success of Basel III, some insights 
could be drawn from the implementation of the previous Basel Accord. 
Australia may have avoided the GFC; however, this does not rule out a 
future crisis. APRA needs to be prepared for future bank failures and to 
consider options for minimizing the risk of failure. Perhaps, a contingency 
plan is critical in the case of a major event, for example, the decision to 
bailout banks in the period of crisis. Nonetheless, APRA has the 
responsibility to improve supervision and prudential standards, by 
ensuring that banks meet regulatory capital requirements, provision for 
bad loans, and publish informative financial information timely. Under 
the direction of APRA, Australian banks have extended these efforts by 
evaluating their capital positions to cover for market risk exposure. 
Stress-testing techniques have been used to identify the probability at 
which a large unexpected trading loss may occur beyond the minimum 
level of capital requirements. It requires banks to keep enough amount 
of capital even under highly adverse market conditions. Even though the 
stress-testing was useful as part of a risk management process, the 
difficulties of the application of these tests were often too restrictive. 
Banks may decide not to publish the full specification of their models that 
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 frustrate the efforts of the supervising authority in validating the 
accuracy of the models. At the same time, banks are worried that, with 
the increased level of disclosure, they may potentially unveil their 
weaknesses to other competitors in the same industry. Practically, the 
implementation of a fully integrated VaR model can be very costly, and 
the ability to model VaR accurately may be constrained by limited data 
availability and computational burdens. Note that banks may wish to 
select models that not only satisfy the regulatory requirements by the 
Basel Committee but also minimize capital costs. These arguments will 
be highlighted in the next chapters.  
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TAIL INDEX OF MAJOR CURRENCIES TRADED IN AUSTRALIA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, extreme events, such as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
have caused large unexpected losses in financial institutions. The 
necessity of central banks to continuously bail out financially distressed 
firms has cast doubt on the adequacy of current risk management 
strategies. Hence, establishing robust risk evaluation techniques to 
manage losses during extreme events become increasingly critical. In 
particular, Value-at-Risk (VaR) has become an important risk 
measurement tool in finance. Despite its popularity, the major challenge 
of VaR concerns with its robust construction to provide an accurate 
forecast of extreme events without knowing the exact dynamics in 
portfolio’s returns. A detailed discussion of VaR is presented in Chapter 
2. 
This study proposes an alternative method to forecast VaR. From a 
probabilistic viewpoint, asset returns can be modelled as the outcomes 
of a sequence of continuous random variables. In that case, extreme 
observations belong to the tail of associated probability distribution. 
Therefore, an understanding of the tail behaviour is crucial where the 
measurement of risk are mostly referred to the observations located at 
the lower tail (Hols and De Vries 1991). The tail index can be 
characterized as the rate at which probability mass decays in the tail of a 
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 distribution (Kearns and Pagan 1997). Let 1, 2 ,..., nX X X be iid random 
variables that represent returns from a distribution, f , 
( ) ( ) 1 kif x P X x Ax
−= > = −                 (3.1) 
where 0A > is a constant and 1 0k
λ
= >  is the tail index. 
The seminal work of Hill (1975) proposed an estimator of tail index based 
on a sample of independently and identically distributed (iid) random 
variables. Hill (2010) extended the Hill (1975) estimator further to 
accommodate a much wider class of data generating processes. Mikosch 
and Starica (2000) and Berkes, Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003) applied 
those estimators for tail index under the assumption that the conditional 
variances of asset returns follow a Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) process. This study generalised 
Hill (1975) estimator to the case of asymmetric extension of GARCH 
model (GJR-GARCH) by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993). 
Empirical studies using the tail index in foreign exchange returns are 
numerous. A notable study by Wagner and Marsh (2005) performed a 
simulation analysis of tail index on foreign exchange returns in a small 
sample setting to estimate the tail of a distribution. While, Payaslioǧlu 
(2009) investigated potential regime switching behaviours of the 
exchange rate in Turkey.  More importantly, the relationship between 
the tail index and VaR of the unconditional distribution was explored in 
the studies of Iglesias and Linton (2009), Iglesias (2012), and Iglesias and 
Lagoa Varela (2012). Their results suggested that tail index provides an 
important avenue to estimate VaR.  
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 The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, the study extends the 
results found in Mikosch and Starica (2000) and Berkes, Horváth, and 
Kokoszka (2003) to accommodate the presence of asymmetric GARCH 
error in the estimation of a tail index. Secondly, it forecasts VaR of foreign 
exchange returns by the proposed estimator with daily exchange rate 
data for an equally-weighted portfolio of AUD with twelve other 
currencies. This approach is based on Iglesias (2012), and Iglesias and 
Lagoa Varela (2012), which apply the tail index estimator proposed in 
Mikosch and Starica (2000), and Berkes, Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003). 
This study provides the first empirical comparison on the impact of model 
specifications in estimating tail index and VaR for the case of GJR-GARCH. 
It is worth noting that the VaR obtained by tail index is unconditional to 
past information. This study will then compare the empirical 
performance of this unconditional VaR forecasts by tail index with the 
unconditional VaR forecasts as suggested by Jorion (1996, 2007) in 
addition to conditional VaR forecasts that incorporate time-varying 
volatility information. An unconditional VaR model provides an overview 
of market risk over long periods, hence, it is appropriate for calculating 
large loss forecasts. Even when the time horizon is shorter, banks often 
prefer unconditional models to avoid frequent undesirable changes in 
market risk limits (Danielsson and de Vries 2000). For a bank which 
rebalances its large and complex portfolios very frequently, the 
conditional models may not be feasible since this requires continuous 
constructing and updating new volatility forecasts that associate with 
high transaction costs. Nevertheless, conditional volatility forecasts are 
important in many situations. When the investment horizon is short, e.g. 
intra-day, conditional models may be preferred for risk forecasting to 
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 accommodate for very large extreme returns in a high volatility period. 
Hence, conditional models imply more volatile risk forecasts than 
unconditional models given that they can quickly adapt to recent 
volatility in the market. Notice that the use of conditional models may 
lead to capital requirements that fluctuate extremely over time. Hence, 
it is impossible for a bank to rapidly adjust its capital base to 
accommodate changing market conditions. A bank may very well use 
unconditional models for market risk capital charges. While, conditional 
and unconditional models give banks different but beneficial information 
about market risk, the choice of the models mainly depends on a bank’s 
trading strategy and its trading environment. Since foreign exchange 
returns are known to be fat-tailed, this study also suggests the use of 
student-t distribution as an alternative to the normal distribution to 
make the comparison between VaR forecasts (see Bollerslev 1987, and 
Angelidis, Benos, and Degiannakis 2004). 
Finally, the robustness of VaR forecasts is also investigated. Some 
statistical tests are conducted to evaluate the quality of VaR forecasts. 
These tests include Kupiec (1995) Test Until the First Failure (TUFF), 
followed by Christoffersen (1998) and Christoffersen, Hahn, and Inoue 
(2001) Unconditional Coverage (UC), Serial Independence (IND) and 
Conditional Coverage (CC) tests. In addition, the performance of VaR 
forecasts is also evaluated by the backtesting procedure required by the 
Basel Committee. A violation is recorded when an actual loss exceeds the 
VaR forecast. This metric is important because a good VaR model should 
lead to a correct estimation of market risk at every point in time. At the 
same time, the regulator can obtain an idea about how well a bank’s VaR 
model predicts its actual market risk exposure. Furthermore, the amount 
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 of capital charges that a bank holds depends on its reported VaR. If banks 
are conservative in estimating risk, higher capital charges are 
subsequently required. Banks are therefore allocated too much capital 
to their trading activities. Nevertheless, the accuracy of VaR forecasts 
and the discipline of risk-sensitive capital charges have crucial 
repercussions for banks and the regulator to improve current risk 
management practices.  
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the new 
estimator for a tail index. A selection of adaptive methods to test the 
models is described in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 provides a review of 
market risk capital requirements by the Basel Committee. Data and main 
results are presented in Section 3.5. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in 
Section 3.6.  
3.2 NEW ESTIMATOR FOR TAIL INDEX 
This section provides a concise overview of the estimation of tail index 
under the assumption that the data generating process follows the 
GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986) and its asymmetric extension by 
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993). 
Let tr denotes the exchange rate return at time t such that: 
1
log tt
t
sr
s −
 
=  
 
           (3.2) 
where, ts denotes the exchange rate of an Australian dollar to foreign 
currency at time t for t = 2, …, T. 
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 Consider the GARCH(1,1) model of Bollerslev (1986), 
           (3.3) 
            (3.4) 
with 0ω > , 0α ≥ , and 0β ≥ . The parameters of the model can be 
estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) under normality, 
which becomes Quasi-MLE (QMLE) if does not follow a normal 
distribution. Bougerol and Picard (1992) showed that if the log-moment 
condition,  
,          (3.5) 
is satisfied, then GARCH(1,1) is stationary and ergodic. Moreover, under 
the same condition, Jeantheau (1998) and Boussama (2000) showed that 
QMLE is consistent and asymptotically normal, respectively. Ling and 
McAleer (2003) provided necessary and sufficient conditions for 
stationarity and ergodicity as well as sufficient conditions for consistency 
and asymptotic normality of QMLE for GARCH( ) but their results 
require slightly stronger assumptions than the log-moment condition in 
the case of GARCH(1,1).  
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) proposed an alternative 
specification for the conditional variance equation aiming to capture the 
asymmetric effects of shocks on the conditional variance. The GJR-
GARCH(1,1) model can be written as: 
         (3.6) 
with 0ω > , 0α ≥ , 0α γ+ ≥  and 0β ≥ ,  
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 where 
 
McAleer, Chan, and Marinova (2007) showed that the log-moment 
condition for GJR-GARCH(1,1) model, namely  
          (3.7) 
is sufficient for consistency and asymptotic normality of QMLE.  
Note that by Jensen’s inequality, 
  
and similar argument holds for the GJR-GARCH case. That is 
.   
Let  be consistent estimates of , respectively. Define
and , then Mikosch and Starica (2000) and Berkes, 
Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003) proposed to estimate the tail index, κ, by 
solving:  
           (3.8) 
where  
         (3.9) 
When , equation (3.6) can be viewed as the sample estimate of the 
log-moment condition. Moreover, if equation (3.5) is true when , it 
implies that the log-moment condition does not hold. Thus, equation (3.8) 
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 provides an alternative way to test the validity of the log-moment 
condition given the fact that is consistent and asymptotically normal as 
shown in Berkes, Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003). Similar results can be 
obtained for GJR-GARCH(1,1) model as demonstrated in the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 1. Let follows the dynamics as defined in equations (3.3) 
and (3.6) with  such that for all . Let 
 denotes the true parameter vector governing the dynamic 
of tr  with and be an estimator of  
based on observations. Define  and 
 with their empirical counterparts 
 and , respectively. If 
(i)  
(ii)  
(iii)  for some 0δ κ>  
then  
, 
where  is the smallest positive number satisfying . 
Proof of Proposition 1. Under conditions (i)-(iii), it is straightforward to 
show there exists decompositions analogue to equations (3.8) and (3.9) 
in Berkes, Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003) GJR-GARCH model as defined in 
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 equations (3.3) and (3.6) This means there is an integer  where 
 and  such that  
  
Using the fact that convergence of monotone functions to a limit is 
uniform over finite intervals, the strong law of large number implies: 
 
and  
. 
Combining these equations give  
 
and this implies 
 
and  
.  
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 Following the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 in Berkes, 
Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003) using the results above gives 
. This completes the proof. 
Remark 1. The proposition above extends the consistency result in 
Berkes, Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003) to GJR-GARCH(1,1) model. When 
0γ = , the result above reduces to Theorem 2.1 in Berkes, Horváth, and 
Kokoszka (2003). 
In practice, κˆ can be obtained by solving  
      
where  
     
Iglesias and Linton (2009) also demonstrated the relationship between 
and VaR for a given significant level, . Formally,  
 [ ] 00tP r VaR c VaR κν νν −= > ≡          (3.10) 
which implies  
     .         (3.11) 
Furthermore, Iglesias and Linton (2009) showed that  
     (3.12) 
is a consistent estimator for 0c .  
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 Therefore, VaR can be estimated as  
         (3.13) 
If the portfolio returns follow a normal distribution, VaRα  can be 
estimated by: 
          (3.14) 
where tr  is the forecast of the portfolio return at time t , ,dqα  is the 
quantile at 0.01α =  of the density of MLE, d , and tσ   is the estimated 
standard deviation of tr with m  denotes the model used. Alternatively, 
if the portfolio returns follow a student-t distribution, ,dqα  is the quantile 
at 0.01α =  of t-density with δ  degrees of freedom. Noted that the 
superscripts “std” and “norm” denotes estimates assuming a normal-
distributed return and a t-distributed return. 
If tr  follows the dynamics as defined in equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6), 
VaR can be estimated from the conditional mean and variance from the 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) models. Similarly, if the returns have a 
conditional student-t distribution, the estimates for the degree of 
freedom, δ  , and tσ  can be obtained from the fitted GARCH(1,1) and GJR-
GARCH(1,1) models.  
 
Page | 52  
 
 3.3 BACKTESTING VAR MODELS 
As proposed by Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) and Pérignon and Smith 
(2008), a backtesting procedure is included to verify if the number of 
actual violations is in line with the forecasted violations over a period of 
time. A violation is recorded when an actual loss on a portfolio exceeds 
the estimated VaR.  
Accordingly, a violation is defined as follows:  
     t tt
t t
r VaR
I
r VaR



<
=
≥
         (3.15) 
Hence, the probability of observing x  violations in a sample size, T, under 
the null hypothesis, is given by: 
1( ) (1 )
T x
t t tP r VaR I pπ
−
−< = − =         (3.16) 
where π  is the desired proportion of observations that should be lower 
than the estimated VaR, which is typically set at 1%. Given that , 
the unconditional coverage test statistic is defined to be 
        (3.17) 
Asymptotically, ucLR  is distributed at 𝜒𝜒2  with one degree freedom. In 
which case, Kupiec (1995) showed that if the proportion of  increases 
then the VaR model underestimates the portfolio’s risk. While, if the 
proportion of  decreases then the VaR model understates the 
probability of large losses in a portfolio, thus, the VaR model becomes 
overly conservative.  
ˆ x
T
π =
ˆ ˆ(1 )2 log
(1 )
x T x
uc x T xLR
π π
π π
−
−
 −
=  − 
πˆ
πˆ
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 Kupiec (1995) also introduced TUFF test that is based on the number of 
observations until the first violation. Under the null hypothesis, TUFFLR  is 
asymptotically distributed at 2χ with one degree freedom.  
          (3.18) 
where τ  denotes the number of observations before the first violation. 
Christoffersen (1998) highlighted that the accuracy of a VaR model can 
be further identified by finding if violations are serially dependent. If 
violations are independent, the probability of a violation should be equal 
to the probability of violation conditional on the previous state. More 
formally, define a sequence of binary random variables  such that  
t t
t
t t
r VaR
x
r VaR



≥
=
<
          (3.19) 
with  and  for . If the violation is 
independent then . In order to test this, Christoffersen (1998) 
proposed the  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  test statistic as follows: 
               (3.20) 
where ijn  is the number of times that the event “  and ” 
occurred with 01
0
1
10
0
0
ˆ n
n n
π =
+
 and 1111
10 11
ˆ n
n n
π =
+
. 
It is possible to test the hypotheses of serial independent and 
unconditional coverage jointly by combining the two test statistics. The 
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 test for conditional coverage as proposed in Christoffersen (1998) and 
Christoffersen, Hahn, and Inoue (2001) defined the test statistic, 
ccLR , 
as  
cc uc indLR LR LR= +           (3.21) 
which is distributed asymptotically as 2χ with two degrees of freedom. 
3.4 THE MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
The use of VaR models was officially sanctioned by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, which amended the 1996 Basel Capital Accord 
to include a capital charge for market risk (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 1996). Banks have a choice between using a standardized 
approach, or their own internal VaR models as the basis for their capital 
charges for market risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011a). 
In practice, the internal models approach leads to lower capital charges 
than the standardized approach, hence, banks prefer to set up their own 
internal VaR models to hold less amount of capital. Consequently, the 
regulator faces an important task of determining the quality of internal 
VaR models that banks use to measure market risk. The performance of 
banks’ internal VaR models and the market risk capital requirements can 
be evaluated as follows (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011a): 
1. A backtest VaR model at time t  with 0.01α =  is used. 
2. A bank must backtest its internal VaR models over the previous 250 
trading days and update its dataset at least once a quarter. 
3. To monitor the frequency of violations, the number of times that the 
actual losses exceed VaR forecasts are calculated. Subsequently, the 
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 percentage of violations can also be calculated. A good model will 
have a percentage of violation that is very close to one percent and 
should lead to a correct estimation of risk at every point in time. A 
VaR model that overestimates risk in a period of low volatility will lead 
to insufficient violations and requires a large amount of capital. On 
the other hand, a VaR model that underestimates risk in a period of 
high volatility will be penalized by the regulator due to excessive 
violations. 
4. The magnitude of a violation is assessed given that large violations are 
of greater concerns than small violations; the actual losses are 
compared with the VaR forecasts. 
5. The market risk capital charge (MRCC) is set either at the lower VaR 
of the previous day or the average VaR of the previous 60 days trading 
days, multiplied by a scaling factor of (3+k). The scaling factor 
calculates the probability that a violation occurs for a given day over 
the previous 250 trading days. It can be written as: 
60
, ,
1
1min ,(3 )
60t t t ti
MRCC VaR k VaRα α
=
 
 
 
= + × ∑         (3.22) 
 
where, 
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
0 4( )
0.40 5( )
0.50 6( )
0.65 7( )
0.75 8( )
0.85 9( )
1 10( )
t
t
t
t t
t
t
t
V Green
V Yellow
V Yellow
k V Yellow
V Yellow
V Yellow
V Red
 ≤
 =
 =

= =
 =
 =
 ≥
           (3.23) 
6. The proportion of each color zone based on equation (3.23) is also 
indicated. A bank is categorized in the green zone if its VaR model is 
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 adequately accurate with no additional capital charge required. 
While, if a bank falls into the yellow zone, an additional capital charge 
will be imposed to justify the excessive number of violations. Finally, 
a bank is categorized in the red zone if its VaR model is not 
appropriate, and will be required to include a greater amount of 
capital charges.  
3.5 RESULTS 
Daily exchange rates on Australian dollar (AUD) with twelve other 
currencies, namely US Dollar (USD), Japanese Yen (JPY), Pound Sterling 
(GBP), New Zealand Dollar (NZD), Korean Won (KRW), Singapore Dollar 
(SGD), Swiss Franc (CHF), Chinese Renminbi (CNY), Hong Kong Dollar 
(HKD), Indian Rupee (IDR), Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), and New Taiwan 
Dollar (TWD) are collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream 
Professional, from the period of 2 January 1984 to 31 December 2013. 
This time is chosen to capture as many major financial events as possible. 
This includes US stock market crash in 1987, European Monetary System 
(EMS) crisis in 1992, Asian currency crisis in 1997, 9/11 events in 2001, 
and the GFC in 2008.  
Using the data above, an equally-weighted portfolio of twelve currencies 
is constructed. This portfolio composition has been widely used in the 
empirical literature, see, for example, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 
(2009). The conditional variance of portfolio returns is modelled through 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) under normal distribution which lead 
to two sets of conditional VaR forecasts and two sets of unconditional 
VaR forecasts by the tail index estimator as proposed in the study. The 
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 study also investigates the performance of the two conditional volatility 
models under student-t distribution. The degrees of freedom set by t-
density are estimated from the standardized residuals that follow a 
normal distribution or a student-t distribution with four critical values 
that leads to four sets of conditional VaR forecasts. In addition, two sets 
of unconditional VaR forecasts derived directly from the mean and 
standard deviation of portfolio returns will also be calculated (see Jorion 
1996, 2007). All VaR forecasts are constructed at 1% level. A total ten sets 
of VaR forecasts is presented for comparison purposes. The sample size 
used for estimation is from 2 January 1984 to 31 December 2002 with 
4,950 observations and the forecasting period is from 2 January 2003 to 
31 December 2013 with 2,871. 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Estimation Period 
(4,950 observations) 
Forecast Period 
(2,871 observations) 
Mean -0.003917 0.010600 
Median 0.001514 0.009578 
Standard Deviation 0.596796 0.659199 
Minimum -4.105 -6.331 
Maximum 4.760 5.998 
Skewness -0.34603*** -0.56366*** 
Kurtosis 8.18774*** 13.35082*** 
Jacque-Bera 5649.52*** 12968.60*** 
Asterisks indicate ***1% significant, **5% significant, *10% significant 
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 The daily returns of the portfolio for both estimation and forecast periods 
are summarized in Table 3.1. The means of the portfolio returns for both 
estimation and forecast periods are close to zero. The standard deviation 
of portfolio returns during estimation period is slightly larger than that of 
the forecast period, indicating the portfolio returns during forecast 
period was more volatile than the portfolio returns during the estimation 
period. The skewness of the portfolio returns for both estimation and 
forecast periods are negative. While, the portfolio returns display high 
kurtosis and fat-tailed. 
Figure 3.1 Histograms of Portfolio Returns 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the histograms of the normal density for portfolio 
returns for both estimation and forecast periods. 
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 Table 3.2 Parameter Estimates 
Density 
in MLE 
Model 
Parameter Estimates 
   
 
 
Second 
moment 
Log-
moment 
Normal 
GARCH(1,1) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0560*** 
(0.0062) 
0.9299*** 
(0.0080) 
  0.9859 -0.0207 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
0.0064*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0310*** 
(0.0066) 
0.9314*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0386*** 
(0.0087) 
 0.9817 -0.0256 
Student-t 
GARCH(1,1) 
0.0069*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0834*** 
(0.0112) 
0.9050*** 
(0.0118) 
 
4.2317*** 
(0.2676) 
0.9884 -0.0239 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
0.0076*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0519*** 
(0.0118) 
0.9057*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0516*** 
(0.0154) 
4.2465*** 
(0.2698) 
0.9834 -0.0293 
Asterisks indicate ***1% significant, **5% significant, *10% significant 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
  
Table 3.2 reports the parameter estimates in the GARCH(1,1) and GJR-
GARCH(1,1) models. For GARCH(1,1) model, the estimates for ω�, α�, and 
?̂?𝛽 are positive. This satisfies the sufficient condition to ensure 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 > 0 in 
both cases. Notice that α� + ?̂?𝛽 < 1, indicating that the second moment 
condition is satisfied as well as the log-moment condition, so the QMLE 
is consistent and asymptotically normal. For GJR-GARCH(1,1) model, the 
estimates for ω�, α�, and ?̂?𝛽 are also positive. Moreover, 0 < α� + ?̂?𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾�
2
<1, thus the sufficient conditions to ensure 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 > 0 are satisfied in both 
cases. Interestingly, the asymmetric coefficient, , is smaller under 
student-t distribution than the normal distribution. The asymmetric 
ωˆ αˆ βˆ γˆ λˆ
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 effect presented in the student-t distribution has a greater impact on 
conditional variance than the one in the normal distribution. As the 
second moment condition is satisfied, the log-moment condition is 
necessarily satisfied, so the QMLE is consistent and asymptotically 
normal.  
Table 3.3 Estimated Values of 𝜿𝜿�, and  𝒄𝒄� with α = 0.01 
Density in MLE Model 𝑘𝑘� ?̂?𝑐 
Normal 
GARCH(1,1) 4.2119 0.2654 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) 4.8762 0.5906 
 
Table 3.3 shows the estimated values for ?̂?𝜅  and ?̂?𝑐  obtained from 
equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.12). It can be observed that ?̂?𝜅  present 
estimated values of greater than 4 in both GARCH(1,1) and GJR-
GARCH(1,1) models. In particular, ?̂?𝜅 obtained under the GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
model shows a greater value of 4.8762 compared to 4.2119 from the 
GARCH(1,1) model. Whereas, the estimated values of ?̂?𝑐  from GJR-
GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(1,1) models are positive. These results are 
consistent with the literature when describing the tail behaviour of 
foreign exchange returns, see, for example, Iglesias and Linton (2009). 
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 Table 3.4 Critical Values 
Model GARCH NstdVaR
−  GJR NstdVaR
−  GARCH tstdVaR
−  GJR tstdVaR
−  Standard-tstdVaR  
Degrees of Freedom 11.3969 11.3969 11.8123 11.9033 3.4566 
 
Table 3.4 presents the critical values for conditional VaR forecasts by 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) models estimated from the 
standardized residuals under normal and t-densities. While, the critical 
value for unconditional VaR forecasts by the Standardized Approach is 
estimated from the t-distribution of portfolio returns. 
Table 3.5 VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
Model 
Conditional 
Unconditional 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard deviation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  -1.3999 (2) -1.2480 -5.8300 -0.7841 0.5987 -2.1780 (1) 

GJR N
normVaR
−  -1.3906 (2) -1.2250 -5.8070 -0.8195 0.5947 -2.3081 (1) 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−  -1.6262 (3) -1.4490 -6.7720 -0.9108 0.6955 
 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  -1.6154 (3) -1.4230 -6.7460 -0.9520 0.6908 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  -1.6495 (4) -1.4670 -7.6580 -0.8670 0.7531 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  -1.6396 (4) -1.4380 -7.6460 -0.8850 0.7587 

Standard N
normVaR
−  
  
-1.3884 (2) 

Standard-t
stdVaR  -1.6567 (4) 
(1) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (3.13) 
(2) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (3.14) based on normal distribution 
(3) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (3.14) based on normal distribution at δ degrees of 
freedom set by t-density 
(4) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (3.14) based on student-t distribution at δ  degrees of 
freedom set by t-density 
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 Table 3.5 summarizes the results for the ten sets of conditional and 
unconditional VaR forecasts. The importance of unconditional VaR 
forecasts by Tail Index Estimator is evident by comparing unconditional 
VaR forecasts by the Standard Approach and conditional VaR forecasts. 
The unconditional VaR forecasts by Tail Index Estimator are lower 
compared to all other VaR forecasts, given that greater estimated values 
of ?̂?𝜅 and  ?̂?𝑐 are shown in Table 3.3. Likewise, the means of conditional 
VaR forecasts constructed under the Student-t distribution appear to be 
lower than the means of conditional VaR forecasts under the normal 
distribution. This should not be surprising as the critical values under the 
student-t distribution are greater than the normal distribution in 
absolute value (see Table 3.4). These results suggest that the 
distributional assumptions are far more important than the choice of 
models in forecasting VaR since foreign exchange returns are non-normal 
with fat-tailed.  
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 Figure 3.2 Portfolio Returns and VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
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 Figure 3.3 Portfolio Returns and Unconditional VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
 
The time series of the daily portfolio returns together with conditional 
VaR forecasts using GARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) models are 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. As can be seen, the portfolio returns were found 
to be non-normal and appeared to be volatility clustering. The significant 
spikes indicated the events at which high volatility occurred. The 
conditional VaR forecasts from student-t distribution are lower than the 
conditional VaR forecasts from the normal distribution. 
Figure 3.3 presents unconditional VaR forecasts by the Standard 
Approach and Tail Index Estimator. Unconditional VaR forecasts remain 
stable over long periods. While, unconditional VaR forecasts by Tail Index 
Estimator are lower than unconditional VaR forecasts by the Standard 
Approach.  
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 Table 3.6 Number and Percentage of Violations for VaR Forecasts at 1% 
Level 
Model 
Conditional Unconditional 
No. of violation % of violation No. of violation % of violation 
 56 1.95% 20 0.70% 
 59 2.06% 15 0.52% 
 32 1.11% 
 
 30 1.04% 
 28 0.98% 
 26 0.91% 
 
 
71 2.47% 
 50 1.74% 
 
Table 3.6 reports the number and percentage of violations for VaR 
forecasts. Ideally, a good model would have a percentage of violation 
that is very close to one percent. A model that underestimates market 
risk gives a percentage of violation that is more than one percent. A 
model that overestimates market risk gives a percentage of violation that 
is less than one percent. For the conditional VaR forecasts from 
GARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) models under normal distribution, 
namely and , high percentages of violation are 
presented at 1.95% and 2.06%, respectively. In contrast, the conditional 
VaR forecasts from GARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) models that utilized 
student-t distribution, namely , , , and 
 appear to perform well with each of the percentage of violation 
very close to one percent. Likewise, the unconditional VaR forecasts 
modelled through the Standard Approach provide more conservative 
estimation in student-t distribution than the normal distribution. These 
results suggest that the VaR forecasts under normality assumption are 
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 inappropriate for measuring portfolio risk. It also implies that the 
probability for large losses is expected under the normality assumption. 
Note that the unconditional VaR forecasts by Tail Index Estimator, 
 and , have the lowest and second-lowest number and 
percentage of violations among all models. These results imply that no 
excessive violation occurred during periods of low volatility in the foreign 
exchange market, with an exception of the extreme financial event in 
2008 due to GFC. Another interesting comparison is the unconditional 
VaR forecasts by the Standard Approach,   and  that 
consistently underestimate market risk with high percentages of 
violation. 
Figures 3.4 to 3.6 illustrate the time series of the daily portfolio returns 
during the forecast period and the time at which VaR violations occurred. 
A violation is recorded when an actual loss exceeds the VaR forecast. The 
episodes of VaR violations are often centralized during the periods of 
high volatility. The events of VaR violations under student-t distribution 
give fewer violations than VaR violations under the normal distribution. 
Note that the unconditional VaR forecasts by Tail Index Estimator provide 
the lowest number of VaR violations (see Table 3.6) and can capture the 
events of violations during periods of high volatility. This model is 
computationally more attractive given that it incorporates time-varying 
conditional information into unconditional VaR forecasts. 
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 Figure 3.4 Portfolio Returns and VaR Violations for GARCH(1,1) and GJR-
GARCH(1,1) models  
 
Page | 68  
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 Figure 3.5 Portfolio Returns and VaR Violations for Tail Index Estimator  
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 Figure 3.6 Portfolio Returns and VaR Violations for Standard Approach  
 
The magnitude of violations can be assessed by the ratios of absolute 
deviation between the actual returns and VaR forecasts. The regulator is 
concerned with whether the VaR forecasts are large enough to cover 
banks’ unexpected trading losses. Hence, the size of large losses can be 
determined by the magnitude of violations. Table 3.7 summarizes the 
ratios of actual losses to the length of VaR forecasts for all models. The 
conditional VaR forecasts under student-t distribution, GARCH NstdVaR − , 

GJR N
stdVaR
− ,GARCH tstdVaR − , and GJR tstdVaR − , consistently provide a mean ratio of 1.012. 
Whereas, a mean ratio of 1.019 is shown by conditional VaR forecasts 
from the normal distribution, GARCH NnormVaR − and GJR NnormVaR − . The unconditional 
VaR forecasts by Tail Index Estimator appear to provide the lowest mean 
ratio. While, the unconditional VaR forecasts by the Standard approach 
provide the highest mean ratio. 
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 Table 3.7 Ratios for Absolute Deviation between Portfolio Returns and VaR 
Forecasts at 1% level 
Model 
Conditional Unconditional 
Mean 
Media
n 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Mean 
Media
n 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  1.01
9 1.008 0.0015 2.651 
1.01
1 1.006 0.0050 3.754 

GJR N
normVaR
−  1.01
9 1.008 0.0005 2.570 
1.00
9 1.006 0.0011 3.599 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−
 
1.01
2 1.007 0.0024 2.421 
 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  1.01
2 1.007 0.0041 2.352 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  1.01
2 1.007 0.0049 2.415 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  1.01
2 1.007 0.0012 2.334 

Standard N
normVaR
−
  
1.03
4 1.012 0.0011 5.320 

Standard-t
stdVaR  1.02
1 1.010 0.0050 4.620 
(1) The ratio is calculated by (VaR Forecast minus Actual Return) divided by Actual Return 
 
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 plot the ratios of actual returns to the length of VaR 
forecasts during the forecast period. A smaller magnitude of violations 
can be seen during periods of low volatility. Whereas, the highest 
magnitude of violations, i.e. the largest size of losses, was observed in 
the year of 2008. 
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 Figure 3.7 Absolute Deviations between Portfolio Returns and VaR Forecasts 
at 1% level 
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 Figure 3.8 Absolute Deviations between Portfolio Returns and Unconditional 
VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
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 Table 3.8 Backtesting Results for VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
Model 
Conditional Unconditional 
TUFF 
(1) 
UC (1) Ind (2) CC (2) TUFF (1) UC (1) Ind (2) CC (2) 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  
0.3715 
20.510
8 
11.536
1 
32.046
9 
2.3128 2.9861 2.2959 5.2820 

GJR N
normVaR
−  
0.3715 
24.738
4 
4.2482 
28.986
6 
17.187
0 
8.0102 0.1576 8.1678 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−
 
0.3523 0.3672 0.8013 1.1685 
 
GJR N
stdVaR
−  0.3715 0.0577 4.2348 4.2925 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  0.3715 0.0179 4.7303 4.7482 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  0.3715 0.2668 5.2757 5.5425 

Standard N
normVaR
−
 
 0.3523 
44.624
1 
24.491
1 
69.115
2 

Standard-t
stdVaR  
 0.3523 
13.057
6 
3.3508 
16.408
5 
(1) The Unconditional Coverage (UC) and Time Until First Failure (TUFF) tests are asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 (1). 
(2) The Serial Independence (Ind) and Conditional Coverage (CC) tests are asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 (2). 
(3) Entries in bold denote rejection of the tests. 
 
The results from the TUFF, UC, Ind and CC tests are given in Table 3.8. For 
the conditional VaR forecasts, GARCH NnormVaR −  and GJR NnormVaR − , the models fail the 
UC, Ind and CC tests due to excessive violations with an exception for Ind 
test in the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model. This suggests that the conditional VaR 
forecasts from those models under normality have serial dependent 
violations. Similarly, the unconditional VaR forecasts modelled by the 
Standard Approach also fail the UC, Ind and CC tests with an exception 
for Ind test in the Standard-tstdVaR model. Ironically, the unconditional VaR 
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 forecasts by Tail Index Estimator under GARCH(1,1) pass TUFF, UC, IND 
and CC tests. While, the unconditional VaR forecasts from GJR-
GARCH(1,1) model did not pass TUFF, UC and CC tests. This result 
suggests that the unconditional VaR forecasts by the Tail Index Estimator 
using the GARCH(1,1) model provide a more precise estimation of market 
risk. 
For the conditional VaR forecasts modelled through the GARCH(1,1) and 
GJR-GARCH(1,1) that follow a student-t distribution, namely GARCH NstdVaR − , 

GARCH t
stdVaR
− , GARCH tstdVaR − , and GJR tstdVaR − , pass TUFF, UC, IND and CC tests. This 
implies that the violations are likely to be independent and the models 
are accurate in estimating the conditional VaR forecasts. Finally, the TUFF 
test results of conditional and unconditional VaR forecasts using normal 
and student-t distributions suggest that all models perform well with an 
exception for the unconditional GJR NnormVaR −  by Tail Index Estimator fails the 
TUFF test. 
Table 3.9 VaRmin at 1% level 
Model 
Conditional 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  -1.506 -1.314 -5.830 -0.854 0.662 

GJR N
normVaR
−  -1.500 -1.292 -5.807 -0.877 0.656 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−  -1.749 -1.534 -6.772 -0.992 0.769 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  -1.742 -1.510 -6.746 -1.019 0.762 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  -1.792 -1.564 -7.658 -0.959 0.827 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  -1.789 -1.548 -7.646 -0.975 0.829 
(1) VaRmin is calculated as the lower VaR of the previous day or the average VaR on the 
previous 60 days 
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 Table 3.9 summarizes the results for VaRmin at 1% level. It represents the 
lower VaR of the previous day or the average VaR on the previous 60 days. 
These VaR values are used to verify the VaR forecasts from Table 3.5. The 
market risk capital charges can then be calculated as the product of 
VaRmin multiplied by a scaling factor from equation (3.22).  
Table 3.10 Number and Percentage of Violations for VaRmin at 1% level 
Model No. of Violation % of Violation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  50 1.74% 

GJR N
normVaR
−  48 1.67% 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−  28 0.97% 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  27 0.94% 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  23 0.80% 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  21 0.73% 
 
Table 3.10 reports the number and percentage of VaRmin violations on the 
previous 250 days. The regulator is concerned with whether the internal 
VaR models adopted by banks provide correct coverage for losses. The 
best model presented is GARCH NstdVaR − at 0.97%, given that it is the closest to 
one percent, followed by GJR NstdVaR − at 0.94%. While, GARCH NnormVaR − and GJR NnormVaR −  
show percentages of greater than one percent of 1.74% and 1.67%, 
respectively. An excessive number of VaR violations is undesirable as it 
indicates that the models underestimate market risk over time. At the 
same time, the capital charges implied by these models may not be 
sufficient to cover the losses. According to the Basel Accord, if too many 
violations are reported, a greater amount of penalty charges is imposed. 
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 
GJR t
stdVaR
− model leads to the lowest number and percentage of VaR 
violations at 0.73%. 
Table 3.11 Scaling Factors 
Model 
Conditional 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  3.27 3 3 4 0.3149 

GJR N
normVaR
−  3.23 3 3 4 0.2994 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−  3.06 3 3 3.65 0.1477 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  3.04 3 3 3.50 0.1138 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  3 3 3 3 0 

GJR t
stdVaR
−       
 
Unconditional 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  3.08 3 3 4 0.2417 

GJR N
normVaR
−  3.07 3 3 3.85 0.2143 

Standard N
normVaR
−  3.32 3 3 4 0.3909 

Standard-t
stdVaR  3.19 3 3 4 0.3380 
(1) The scaling factor is calculated as 3+k, where k is the violation penalty 
 
Table 3.11 shows the scaling factors as required by the Basel Committee. 
Of particular interest, Standard NnormVaR − gives the highest mean of scaling factor 
at a level of 3.32, while GARCH tstdVaR − always give a consistent scaling factor of 
3. While, the maximum scaling factor of 4 is observed for GARCH NnormVaR − , 

GJR N
normVaR
− ,GARCH NnormVaR − ,Standard NnormVaR − , and Standard-tstdVaR .  
Page | 78  
 
 Table 3.12 Capital Charges for VaRmin at 1% level 
Model 
Conditional 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  -5.043 -4.235 -23.070 -2.562 2.7555 

GJR N
normVaR
−  -4.978 -4.112 -23.230 -2.632 2.7290 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−  -5.420 -4.614 -23.450 -2.976 2.7124 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  -5.307 -4.552 -22.940 -3.057 2.4032 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  -5.424 -4.706 -22.970 -2.876 2.5049 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  -5.367 -4.645 -22.940 -2.926 2.4881 
 
Unconditional 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  -6.698 -6.534 -8.712 -6.534 0.5264 

GJR N
normVaR
−  -7.077 -6.924 -8.886 -6.924 0.4947 

Standard N
normVaR
−  -4.604 -4.165 -5.553 -4.165 0.5426 

Standard-t
stdVaR  -5.279 -4.970 -6.627 -4.970 0.5599 
(1) The  capital charge is calculated as the lower VaR of the previous day or the average 
VaR on the previous 60 days (VaRmin), multiplied by a scaling factor of (3+k), where k is 
the violation penalty 
 
A major reason for the implementation of VaR models by the Basel 
Committee is the determination of market risk capital requirements. If 
the banks underestimate the VaR forecasts, they are penalized by an 
increase in the scaling factor. If, however, the banks overestimates the 
VaR forecasts, a constant scaling factor of 3 is imposed.  Table 3.12 shows 
the market risk capital charges that are a product of VaRmin (Table 3.9) 
multiplied by a scaling factor (Table 3.11). For the case of conditional VaR 
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 models, it can be seen that GARCH tstdVaR −  gives the lowest mean of capital 
charge at -5.424 and GJR NnormVaR − gives the highest mean of capital charge at -
4.978. While, the lowest capital charge is given by GARCH NstdVaR −  at -23.45, 
followed by GJR NnormVaR − at -23.23, and GARCH NnormVaR − at -23.07. These capital costs 
are mostly charged during the GFC, where sharp negative spikes of 
capital charges are shown in Figure 3.9. On the other hand, the highest 
capital charge is given by GARCH NnormVaR −  at -2.562, followed by GJR NnormVaR − at -
2.632. These charges occur during periods of low volatility in the foreign 
exchange market. For the case of unconditional VaR models, the lowest 
mean of capital charge is presented by unconditional GJR NnormVaR − by Tail 
Index Estimator at -7.077 and the highest mean of capital charge is 
presented by unconditional Standard NnormVaR − by the Standard Approach at -
4.604. Likewise, unconditional GJR NnormVaR −  by Tail Index Estimator has the 
lowest capital charge at -8.886, followed by unconditional GARCH NnormVaR −  by 
Tail Index Estimator at -8.712, unconditional Standard-tstdVaR at -6.627 and 
unconditionalStandard NnormVaR − at -5.553.  
A higher amount of capital charge is undesirable by banks as it increases 
the capital costs in their trading activities. Banks prefer to maintain 
capital charges as low as possible with a scaling factor of 3. More 
importantly, banks can now design their own internal models and make 
decisions by focusing on the current volatility levels by applying past 
information. These volatility levels can assist banks to select the most 
appropriate VaR model for periods of high or low volatility. For a bank 
which rebalances its large and complex portfolios very frequently, the 
conditional models may not be feasible since this requires continuous 
constructing and updating new volatility forecasts that associates with 
high transaction costs. Notice that the use of conditional models may 
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 lead to capital charges that fluctuate extremely over time. It is impossible 
for a bank to adjust its capital base rapidly to accommodate changing 
market conditions. A bank may very well use unconditional models for 
market risk capital charges during periods of high volatility. On the other 
hand, a bank may apply conditional models during periods of low 
volatility to avoid high market risk capital charges. The use of 
unconditional VaR forecasts by Tail Index Estimator is evident in this case 
as it has the lowest potential for large extreme losses given that it has 
the lowest number and percentage of violations. This situation is 
desirable by banks since the capital charges can be maintained at a 
consistent level without suffering from additional capital costs (see 
Figure 3.10). 
Figure 3.9 demonstrates the episodes at which capital charges are most 
likely to occur. It can be seen that due to extreme negative returns during 
the GFC of 2008, the capital charges are imposed at the highest costs. 
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show that capital charges can be maintained at a 
constant level during periods of low volatility with an exception of 
additional capital charges during periods of high volatility. 
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 Figure 3.9 Capital Charges and VaRmin at 1% level 
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 Figure 3.10 Capital Charges and Unconditional VaRmin for Tail Index 
Estimator 
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 Figure 3.11 Capital Charges and Unconditional VaRmin for Standard 
Approach  
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 Table 3.13 Proportion of Time Staying in a Color Zone 
Model 
Conditional Unconditional 
Green Yellow Red Green Yellow Red 

GARCH N
normVaR
−  56.16% 43.45% 0.38% 90.91% 6.90% 2.19% 

GJR N
normVaR
−  59.19% 39.66% 1.15% 91.19% 8.81% 0% 

GARCH N
stdVaR
−  85.61% 14.42% 0% 
 

GJR N
stdVaR
−  91.29% 8.74% 0% 

GARCH t
stdVaR
−  93.97% 6.06% 0% 

GJR t
stdVaR
−  100.00% 0.00% 0% 

Standard N
normVaR
−  
 
56.77% 28.21% 15.01% 

Standard-t
stdVaR  73.42% 16.13% 10.45% 
 
Table 3.13 provides the proportion of time staying in green, yellow and 
red zones as indicated by the Basel Accord. The green zone is desirable 
by all banks, as this shows the number of violations is within the limit set 
by the Basel Accord. A bank is categorized in the red zone if its VaR model 
is not appropriate, and will be required to pay a greater amount of capital 
charges. Figures 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 exhibit the periods of when green, 
yellow and red zones are likely to occur for all VaR models. Conditional 

GJR t
stdVaR
− model spends most of the time in the green zone. Conditional 

GARCH t
stdVaR
− , GJR NstdVaR
− , and GARCH NstdVaR − models under student-t distribution 
represent a proportion of time above 80% in the green zone, and 
substantially spending less time in the yellow zone. Similarly, 
unconditional GJR NnormVaR −  by Tail Index Estimator appears to stay in the 
green zone more often than yellow zone. However, conditional GARCH NnormVaR −  
and GJR NnormVaR − , and unconditional GARCH NnormVaR − by Tail Index Estimator models 
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 under normal distribution tend to stay in the red zone due to excessive 
losses during the GFC (see Figures 3.12 and 3.13). Unconditional 

Standard N
normVaR
− and Standard-tstdVaR models by the Standard Approach have 
performed poorly with 15.01% and 10.45% stay in the red zone, 
respectively (see Figure 3.14). It can be concluded that during periods of 
low volatility, VaR violations are expected to be less, all models tend to 
stay in the green zone. During periods of high volatility, more VaR 
violations are expected hence, there is a tendency to stay in the red zone. 
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 Figure 3.12 VaR Violations and VaRmin at 1% level 
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 Figure 3.13 VaR Violations and Unconditional VaRmin for Tail Index Estimator 
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 Figure 3.14 VaR Violations and Unconditional VaRmin for Standard Approach  
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 3.6 CONCLUSION 
By extending the results in Berkes, Horváth, and Kokoszka (2003), this 
study proposes a consistent estimator of the tail index for GJR-GARCH 
error. The performance of VaR forecasts under the GARCH(1,1) and GJR-
GARCH(1,1) models following different distributional assumptions are 
also investigated. Also, this study provides the first empirical comparison 
of the impact of model specifications in estimating tail index and VaR. 
This study adds to the literature in several important directions. Firstly, 
when the student-t distribution is used, VaR forecasts lead to more 
accurate number and percentage of violations compared to the normal 
distribution. The result suggests that VaR forecasts under normal 
distribution are more conservative in estimating portfolio risk. Secondly, 
even though modelling unconditional VaR forecasts using the Standard 
Approach is widely accepted and used by the financial industry, the 
results are overly conservative as compared to the unconditional VaR 
forecasts by Tail Index Estimator as proposed in the study. This study also 
provides a significant input where banks can assess the likelihood of 
trading losses parsimoniously and efficiently and able to develop trading 
strategies according to their trading environments. Finally, the 
conditional VaR forecasts from GJR-GARCH(1,1) model represents the 
most appropriate model given that it ranks the best among all models 
with a percentage of violation that is very close to one percent. Besides, 
the model has correctly accepted all statistical tests including TUFF, UC, 
Ind and CC tests.  
Theoretically, conditional models that incorporate time-varying volatility 
information are more desirable than unconditional models that consider 
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 the conditional distribution of asset returns. In practice, unconditional 
models are more desirable by banks given that it is less complicated and 
easy to calculate. In addition, capital charges can be maintained at a 
constant level during periods of low volatility without additional 
transaction costs. Nevertheless, an accurate VaR measure relying on 
appropriate modelling is necessary to correctly estimate the market risk 
as such that the risk management process is aided considerably by the 
backtesting procedures described in this study. As capital charges 
represent a significant cost to the banks, this study shows that banks 
should exercise great care in selecting an optimal VaR model. In risk 
forecasting, VaR is often concerned with multivariate return series. The 
empirical applications of conditional correlations across different assets 
in a portfolio are presented in Chapter 4. 
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A TALE BETWEEN UNIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE 
VOLATILITY MODELS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Modelling volatility in financial time series has been an important 
research area in the past decades. The family of Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model was first introduced by 
Engle (1982) who laid the foundation for a new approach to describe and 
forecast conditional variance for financial time series. Subsequently, 
numerous variants and extensions of ARCH models have been proposed. 
See for examples, the Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model of Bollerslev 
(1986) and its asymmetric extension by Glosten, Jagannathan, and 
Runkle (1993). Some of the details of these models can be found in 
preceding chapter that has a specific focus on Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
forecasting.  
In many financial applications, conditional covariance and correlations 
play a direct and important role in volatility forecasting. A bank is very 
likely to trade with large and complex portfolios daily. It is unlikely that 
the asset returns in a portfolio would move independently of each other. 
Therefore, understanding their correlation structures is essential in 
deriving sensible investment strategies to maximize returns while 
minimizing risk. Most of the existing univariate volatility models focus on 
the dynamics of a single time series, and they do not provide any 
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 information on the potential dependency between asset returns within 
a portfolio. It is worth noting that the correlation between asset returns 
may be driven by individual heterogeneity as well as any potential 
common factors. This implies that the correlation structures may be 
time-varying. For example, the correlation between Standard & Poor's 
500 (S&P 500) and Nikkei 225 is likely to be different before and after the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The correlation before the crisis may be 
driven by normal market condition whereas the GFC forms a single factor 
that caused significant changes in the correlation between the two 
indices.  
To capture the conditional covariance and correlations for the different 
type of assets in a portfolio, many researchers expanded the univariate 
to multivariate volatility models. McAleer (2005) pointed out that one 
important aspect of modelling financial volatility is to study multivariate 
extensions of the conditional volatility models. Bollerslev, Engle, and 
Wooldridge (1988) proposed the diagonal vector ARCH (DVEC) model 
that is a direct extension of the univariate Generalized ARCH (GARCH) 
model to multivariate model. Other alternative approaches for achieving 
more parsimonious and empirically tractable multivariate volatility 
models are the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model of 
Bollerslev (1990); Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (BEKK) model described 
by Engle and Kroner (1995); the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) 
model of Engle (2002); the Time-Varying Correlation (TVC) model of Tse 
and Tsui (2002); the Vector ARMA-GARCH (VARMA-GARCH) model of 
Ling and McAleer (2003); and the VARMA-asymmetric GARCH (VARMA-
AGARCH) model of McAleer, Hoti, and Chan (2009). However, the 
practical usefulness of these models can be affected by ‘the curse of 
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 dimensionality’ (see Caporin and McAleer 2014). That is, the number of 
parameters increases dramatically in these models as the number of 
asset increases. 
The CCC model of Bollerslev (1990) assumed that the conditional 
covariance is driven solely by the corresponding conditional variances so 
that the conditional correlations are constant. This assumption greatly 
reduces the number of parameters and thus simplifies the multivariate 
estimation problem. The model follows a 2-step estimation procedure: 
in the first step, univariate models are estimated for each of the asset 
returns and then, in the second step, the conditional correlations are 
estimated from the standardized residuals for each of the univariate 
series provided by the first step. An advantage of CCC model is that when 
the conditional variances are positive, and the conditional correlation 
matrix is positive definite, the conditional covariance matrix is 
guaranteed to be positive definite. The specification for CCC model is 
explained the subsequent section. 
Even though CCC model has been widely used in the empirical literature 
because of its computational simplicity, several empirical studies have 
shown that the assumption of constant conditional correlation may not 
hold in practice. In particular, Longin and Solnik (1995) performed 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests with a CCC-GARCH(1,1) model to assess the 
conditional covariance and conditional correlations for a  set of cross-
country stock market returns from the year of 1960 to 1990. They found 
evidence in support of strong correlations between cross-country stock 
market returns during periods of extreme market conditions but weak or 
no correlations outside of these events. Similarly, Tse (2000) applied 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for three datasets with daily frequency on 
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 spot-future returns, foreign exchange returns, and stock market returns. 
While, Nakatani and Teräsvirta (2009) extended LM tests with a CCC-
GARCH(1,1) model and the Extended Constant Conditional Correlation 
(ECCC) GARCH model of Jeantheau (1998) to daily foreign exchange 
returns and stock market returns. On the other hand, Bera and Kim (2002) 
conducted Information Matrix (IM) tests for the constancy of the 
conditional correlation on selected stock market returns in a bivariate 
GARCH model. These researchers showed that the structure of 
conditional correlations between asset returns is time-varying, hence, 
CCC model is inappropriate for some empirical applications. 
To accommodate possible time-varying conditional correlations, Engle 
(2002) and Tse and Tsui (2002) proposed alternative approaches to 
model time-varying conditional correlations by extending the CCC model. 
Similar to the CCC model, the DCC model of Engle (2002) and the TVC 
model of Tse and Tsui (2002) follow a 2-step estimation procedure. First, 
univariate models for each of the asset returns are estimated. In contrast 
to the CCC model, the second step estimation in the DCC and TVC models 
require the use of numerical optimization techniques to estimate the 
parameters of the time-dependent conditional correlations matrix. The 
DCC and TVC models are useful in high dimensional financial time series 
and are likely to provide additional information regarding the correlation 
structures between the time series. 
Some alternatives to the DCC and TVC models have been proposed to 
allow for greater flexibility to capture different dependencies in the 
correlations across different types of assets and different responses to 
the past negative and positive returns. One such alternative is the 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Correlation (GARCC) model of 
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 McAleer et al. (2008). It provides a more general representation in which 
the standardized residuals follow Vector Autoregressive (VAR) process 
with random coefficients. Other multivariate models that allow for 
greater reduction of the dependencies in the correlation across different 
types of assets by selecting a reasonability small numbers of factors are 
Factor ARCH models proposed by Diebold and Nerlove (1989) and Engle, 
Ng, and Rothschild (1990); Orthogonal GARCH model of Alexander (2001); 
and Generalized Orthogonal GARCH (GO-GARCH) model of van der 
Weide (2002). Another approach in modelling conditional covariance and 
correlations is the use of copulas proposed by Patton (2002) and Jondeau 
and Rockinger (2006).  
There are a huge number of studies that estimate VaR forecasts using 
multivariate GARCH models. Hsu Ku and Wang (2008) examined the 
performance of multivariate GARCH models, namely the CCC, DCC and 
BEKK models, regarding VaR violations on a portfolio of foreign exchange 
rates. They found that time-varying conditional correlation is an 
important consideration for portfolio risk management. The DCC model 
is considered to be the best model that offers a better forecasting 
performance among the other two models in estimating VaR.  
da Veiga, Chan, and McAleer (2011) also examined the importance of 
accommodating time-varying conditional correlation when forecasting 
VaR. They used both CCC and DCC models on the portfolios of Chinese A 
and Chinese B stock returns. On one hand, DCC model provides a lower 
number of violations than the CCC model. On the other hand, CCC model 
tends to generate a lower amount of daily capital charges than the DCC 
model. Consequently, they showed that a more severe penalty structure 
is probably desirable to discourage banks from choosing forecasting 
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 models that underestimate VaR. In particular, they proposed a new 
penalty structure that is based on the magnitude of violations instead of 
the current penalty structure that is based on the number of violations. 
An appropriate penalty structure may encourage banks to improve their 
risk models in forecasting VaR more precisely.  
Santos, Nogales, and Ruiz (2013) compared the performance of VaR 
forecasts using univariate and multivariate GARCH models, namely the 
GARCH model of Bollerslev (1986), the asymmetric extension of GARCH 
(GJR) model by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), the Exponential 
GARCH (EGARCH) model of Nelson (1991), the Asymmetric Power ARCH 
(APARCH) model of Ding, Granger, and Engle (1993), CCC and DCC models 
on a portfolio of the US stock returns. Their results showed that the 
multivariate GARCH models particularly DCC-GJR model under student-t 
distribution improves VaR estimation. Nevertheless, these studies 
showed that accommodating time-varying conditional correlations 
improve the forecasting performance of VaR. 
There are some studies in the literature that considered the use of 
different distributional assumptions in multivariate GARCH models to 
forecast VaR. In particular, Bauwens and Laurent (2005) proposed a 
multivariate skewed-t distribution for multivariate GARCH models on the 
portfolios of the US stock returns and foreign exchange rates. They found 
that the multivariate GARCH models under multivariate skewed-t 
distribution improve the performance of VaR forecasts. Similarly, 
Rombouts and Verbeek (2009) evaluated the performance of VaR 
forecasts at the 1-percent, 2.5-percent and 5-percent significance levels 
using multivariate GARCH models, namely the DVEC, TVC and DCC 
models, on a portfolio of stock market returns. These models consider 
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 three different distribution assumptions including normal, student-t and 
non-parametric distributions. Their results showed that the multivariate 
GARCH models under a non-parametric distribution obtained using a 
kernel density technique improves VaR estimation. Pesaran and Pesaran 
(2010) examined the DCC model, assuming a student-t distribution 
instead of a normal distribution of the portfolios of foreign exchange 
rates, bonds and stock index futures. They found that the DCC model with 
a student-t distribution gives a more robust estimation of VaR forecasts 
than the DCC model with a normal distribution, given that the financial 
time series exhibit heavy tails (see also, Lee, Chiou, and Lin 2006). Hence, 
these studies suggested that the choice of density assumptions is critical 
to improving the performance of VaR forecasts. 
This chapter is outlined as follows. The structural properties of VARMA-
GARCH, VARMA-AGARCH, CCC and DCC models are given in Section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 describes the data and presents some summary statistics. 
Subsequently, the empirical results and the performance of VaR 
forecasts based on CCC and DCC models are discussed. Section 4.4 
concludes the chapter. 
4.2 CONDITIONAL VOLATILITY MODELS AND VAR FORECASTS 
This section provides a brief discussion of conditional volatility models 
for purposes of their estimation and the relationship between 
conditional volatility and VaR forecasts. 
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 Consider the following model:  
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where ( )1 ,..., 't t ktrr r=  is a 1k ×  vector of asset returns and 1,...,t T= , with 
L  denotes the lag operator such that for any time series ty , 1t tLy y −= . 
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i
i
L I Lφ
=
Φ = − ∑  and 
1
( )
q
i
i
i
L I Lθ
=
Θ = + ∑  are the lag polynomials of order p  
and q , respectively. tη  is a 1k ×  independently and identically distributed 
multivariate random vector with zero mean and identity variance-
covariance matrix.  
Following the model as defined in equation (4.1), McAleer, Hoti, and 
Chan (2009) proposed the VARMA-AGARCH model, namely, 
1 1 1
r r s
t i t i i t i t i j t j
i i j
H W A C I B Hε ε− − − −
= = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑             (4.2) 
where ( )1 ,..., 't t ktH h h=  and ( )2 21 ,..., 't t ktε ε ε= . W  is a 1k ×  vector; iA  , iB  and 
iC are k k×  matrices with 1,...,i r=  and ; ( )1 ,...,t t ktI diag I I= with
0,  0
 1,  0 .
it
it
it
I
ε
ε
≥
=  <
This model assumes that the positive and negative shocks 
have differential impacts on the conditional variance, 
ith , 1,...,i k= .  
If 0iC = , equation (4.2) reduces to the VARMA-GARCH model of Ling and 
McAleer (2003). In that case, 
1 1
r s
t i t i j t j
i j
H W A B Hε − −
= =
= + +∑ ∑            (4.3) 
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 This model assumes that a positive shock has the same impact on the 
conditional variance as a negative shock. 
By setting 1k =  and ( ) ( ) 1L LΦ = Θ =  or by specifying iA  and jB  are diagonal 
matrices for all i  and j , equation (4.3) reduces to the CCC model of 
Bollerslev (1990). The CCC model assumes that the conditional variance 
follows a univariate GARCH process. If 
iC , iA  and jB  are diagonal 
matrices for all i  and j , equation (4.2) reduces to the asymmetric GARCH 
(GJR) model of Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993). 
Following equation (4.1), the conditional variance and covariance matrix 
of tr  is
1 1
2 2
t t t tD DΓΩ = , where ( )'t t t tη ηΓ =   denotes k k× matrix of the 
conditional correlations between the conditional shocks.   and 
t  
denotes the unconditional and conditional expectation with respect to 
the information set at time t , respectively. The CCC model assumes that 
the conditional correlations are constant over time. In that case, 
{ }ijρΓ = is a constant conditional correlation matrix with ij jiρ ρ= . Engle 
(2002) and Tse and Tsui (2002) proposed the DCC model and the TVC 
model, respectively, to allow the conditional correlations to be time-
varying, so that the conditional variance and covariance matrix of tr  is 
time-varying. Hence, the dynamic of volatility depends on the 
specification of  
iΩ  . 
An alternative model is represented by Engle and Kroner (1995) who 
introduced the Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (BEKK) model. Following the 
specification of conditional mean in equation (4.1), 
1 1
' '' '
r s
t i t i t i t j
i j
i j jε ε− − −
= =
Ω Μ Μ= Π Π + + ΩΝ Ν∑ ∑         (4.4) 
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 where Π , 
iM  and jN  are k k×  matrices, 1,...,i r=  and 1,..., .j s=  In the case 
of BEKK, the number of parameters is 2
( 1) ( )
2
k k r s k+  + + 
 
. An advantage 
of this specification is that the conditional covariance matrix is positive 
definite as long as Π  also is. Caporin and McAleer (2012) provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the empirical applications between BEKK 
and DCC models. 
The parameters in these models are typically estimated by Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE), which is defined to be: 
1
1
ˆ arg max log '
2
T
t t t t
t
T H H
θ
θ ε ε−
∈Λ =
 
= − + 
 
∑           (4.5) 
where 
, with 
 denotes the vec operator such  converts a matrix  into 
a  vector by stacking the columns of . tH  denotes the 
determinant of tH  . See McAleer (2005) and McAleer et al. (2008) for 
more technical discussions on this class of models, including the 
sufficient conditions for the existence of moments and the sufficient 
conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality of QMLE. 
Under the assumption of equation (4.1), the VaR forecast at 0.01α =  for 
asset i  at time 1t +  can be obtained as: 

, 1 , 1, 1 ,( )
m
t i t
m
i it tdVaR r q hα ++ += +          (4.6) 
where , 1( )t i tr +  is the forecast of the asset i ’s return based on the 
information at time t , 
,dqα  is the critical value based on the significant 
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 level of VaR and the distribution of 
tη . Although tη  is typically assumed 
to be normally distributed, a student-t distribution with δ  degrees of 
freedom can be used an alternative.  , 1
m
i th + is the estimated standard 
deviation of , 1( )t i tr +  with m  denotes the model used. Noted that the 
superscripts “std” and “norm” denotes estimates assuming a normal 
distributed return and a t-distributed return. 
4.3 RESULTS 
This section describes the data used and presents some summary 
statistics. The empirical results for VaR forecasts based on the CCC and 
DCC models are also discussed. The analysis of some statistical tests and 
the backtesting procedures set by the Basel Accord to evaluate the 
performance of VaR forecasts are also presented. The details of 
backtesting procedures can be found in the preceding chapters. 
A dataset of daily exchange rates on Australian dollar (AUD) with twelve 
other currencies is used. The exchange rates are US Dollar (USD), 
Japanese Yen (JPY), Pound Sterling (GBP), New Zealand Dollar (NZD), 
Korean Won (KRW), Singapore Dollar (SGD), Swiss Franc (CHF), Chinese 
Renminbi (CNY), Hong Kong Dollar (HKD), Indian Rupee (IDR), Malaysian 
Ringgit (MYR), and New Taiwan Dollar (TWD). These exchange rates are 
collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream Professional, for the period 
of 2 January 1984 to 31 December 2013. Using the data above, an 
equally-weighted portfolio of twelve currencies is constructed.  
A rolling window approach is used to estimate the parameter estimates 
for the CCC models. In that case, the patterns for changing conditional 
correlations and the possibility of structural breaks between each pair of 
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 currencies can also be observed. The entire period ranges from 2 January 
1984 to 31 December 2013, with a total of 7,821 observations. Rolling 
conditional correlations are estimated with a window size set to 4,950 
observations. The estimation sample is then rolled over the entire period. 
By keeping the estimation period constant, the estimation sample starts 
at the beginning of the data period until the sample ends on the last day 
of the data period. In this case, the estimation period starts from 2 
January 1984 to 31 December 2002, with observations from the 1st to the 
4,950th observation. Then, the window is rolled 1-day forward from 3 
January 1984 to 1 January 2003, with observations from the 2nd to the 
4,951th observation, until the last rolling window with observations from 
the 2,871th to the 7,821th. Each rolling window size is constantly kept at 
4,950 observations. The result of this procedure will cover all the 
consecutive rolling sample periods, with a total of 2,871 observations. 
There are four sets of VaR forecasts estimated from the CCC-GARCH(1,1), 
CCC-GJR(1,1), DCC-GARCH(1,1) and DCC-GJR(1,1) models for normal 
distribution. The study also investigates the performance of these 
models under a student-t distribution with δ  degrees of freedom. The 
degrees of freedom set by t-density are estimated from the standardized 
residuals that follow GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1,1) processes utilized under 
normal and student-t distributions. This gives eight critical values that 
lead to eight sets of VaR forecasts (see Table 4.1). Another approach is 
used where the degrees of freedom set by t-density are estimated from 
the standardized residuals that follow GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1,1) 
processes utilized under normal and student-t distributions for every 
rolling window (see Figure 4.1). This leads to additional eight sets of VaR 
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 forecasts. A total 20 sets of VaR forecasts are presented for comparison 
purposes. All VaR forecasts are constructed at 1% level. 
Table 4.1 Critical Values for CCC and DCC models 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
CCC-GARCH(1,1) CCC-GJR(1,1) DCC-GARCH(1,1) DCC-GJR(1,1) 
N
stdδ   11.2305 11.2961 13.2883 13.2979 
t
stdδ  11.9481 11.9791 13.2691 13.2724 
 
Figure 4.1 Rolling Critical Values for CCC and DCC models 
 
Figure 4.1 plots the critical values estimated from the standardized 
residuals that follow GARCH(1,1) and GJR(1,1) processes utilized under a 
normal distribution or a student-t distribution for every rolling window. 
It can be seen that the critical values based on student-t distribution are 
lower than the critical values from the normal distribution. There is a very 
sharp increase in critical values after the year 2012. This implies that as 
the estimation sample is rolled over towards the end of the sample 
period, the degrees of freedom increase to the normal distribution. 
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 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the daily returns of each currency during the 
estimation and forecast periods. All currencies display means and 
medians that are very close to zero. CNY has the highest return at 42.04 
and KRW has the lowest return at -23.13 during the estimation period. 
Whereas, CHF has the highest return at 9.527 and JPY has the lowest 
return at -10.06 during the forecast period. 
All currencies, except NZD, CNY, IDR, and MYR, are negatively skewed 
during the estimation period. While during the forecast period, all 
currencies, except NZD and CHF, are negatively skewed. All currencies 
exhibit excess kurtosis during estimation and forecast periods. Of 
particular interest, CNY, NZD, KRW, and IDR have extreme excess kurtosis 
at 760.7898, 269.3207, 121.0553 and 109.4368, respectively, during the 
estimation period. Finally, all currencies are found to be non-normal 
according to Jarque-Bera test statistic with CNY, NZD, KRW, and IDR 
display extreme non-normalities during estimation period. While during 
the forecast period, CHF, KRW, JPY, MYR, and SGD display extreme non-
normalities. 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the histograms of normal density for each 
currency during estimation and forecast periods. NZD, KRW, CNY, and 
IDR show greater dispersions at a mean of zero during the estimation 
period.  While, the distributions of all foreign exchange returns during 
the forecast period are asymmetric. This is established by the minimum 
and maximum returns in Table 4.3. 
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 Table 4.2 Summary Statistics for Each Currency Returns during the Estimation Period 
 USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
Mean -
0.0092 
-
0.0229 
-
0.0114 -0.0049 -0.0011 
-
0.0133 
-
0.0184 0.0197 
-
0.0092 0.0352 0.0006 
-
0.0122 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard 
Deviation 0.6331 0.8307 0.7815 0.6545 0.9755 0.6343 0.8868 0.9819 0.6318 1.6488 0.7639 0.6661 
Minimum -
4.5610 
-
5.1920 
-
4.4780 -7.7680 -23.1300 
-
4.4940 
-
5.1370 -5.9050 
-
4.5290 -16.2500 -6.4320 
-
4.8940 
Maximum 3.3870 4.9690 5.7070 6.5440 9.5550 3.6230 5.3520 42.0400 3.3770 38.2900 11.4900 4.3430 
Skewness -
0.5007 
-
0.4224 
-
0.0148 7.6332 -2.8596 
-
0.4230 
-
0.2362 19.3925 
-
0.5090 4.2672 0.5852 
-
0.4147 
Kurtosis 7.4198 5.7410 5.9273 269.3207 121.0553 6.6482 5.4427 760.7898 7.4370 109.4368 21.6650 7.8994 
Jacque-Bera 4235.7
3 
1696.7
1 
1767.5
6 
14676698.9
9 
2881261.6
3 
2892.6
9 
1276.6
5 
118748380.6
0 
4274.1
3 
2351586.4
4 
72135.9
7 
5092.6
6 
(1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
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 Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for Each Currency Returns during the Forecast Period 
 USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
Mean 0.0158 0.0117 0.0146 0.0003 0.0115 0.0047 0.0005 0.0049 0.0156 0.0265 0.0107 0.0105 
Median 0.0000 0.0338 0.0150 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 0.0132 0.0110 0.0000 
Standard Deviation 0.8586 1.0831 0.6813 0.4686 0.7390 0.6642 0.8349 0.8448 0.8545 0.8022 0.7326 0.7725 
Minimum -7.7370 -10.0600 -6.6950 -3.1750 -7.9620 -6.7860 -6.3480 -7.8180 -7.7750 -6.6590 -7.4810 -7.0960 
Maximum 7.1560 9.3060 4.0670 3.0930 5.2250 6.0390 9.5270 7.3090 7.1460 5.6660 6.4780 6.9060 
Skewness -0.3687 -0.5873 -0.5313 0.0233 -1.0796 -0.6229 0.1513 -0.3758 -0.3838 -0.4495 -0.4984 -0.4244 
Kurtosis 11.2852 14.5525 9.3842 6.7236 15.7178 14.3853 16.4509 11.9349 11.5793 9.4866 14.5438 12.0706 
Jacque-Bera 8276.71 16130.25 5010.73 1658.89 19906.05 15692.03 21654.26 9617.45 8875.33 5130.10 16060.08 9928.35 
(1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
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 Figure 4.2 Histograms for Each Currency Returns during the Estimation 
Period 
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 Figure 4.3 Histograms for Each Currency Returns during the Forecast Period 
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 Figure 4.4 Daily Returns for Each Currency 
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 Figure 4.4 shows the daily returns for each respective currency. The 
volatility clustering of foreign exchange returns can be seen. All 
currencies displayed extreme movements during the periods of 2008 to 
2009 due to the GFC. With exceptions for KRW for the periods from 1997 
to 1998 due to Asian Financial Crisis, NZD in the year of 1984 due to 
constitutional crisis5, IDR in the year of 1986 due to severe devaluation 
against USD; and CNY in the years of 1987 due to US stock market crash, 
1990 and 1994 due to devaluation against USD. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report the parameter estimates of CCC models follow 
the GARCH(1,1) process. While Tables 4.6 and 4.7 report the parameter 
estimates of CCC models follow the GJR(1,1) process. These tables also 
provide the estimates under normal and student-t distributions. It is 
worth noting that the parameter estimates are not significantly different 
between normal and student-t distributions. The estimates for ω  , α  
and β  are positive for CCC-GARCH(1,1) and CCC-GJR(1,1) models. 
Moreover, the volatility persistence,  ˆ 1α β+ <  for CCC-GARCH(1,1) model 
and 0 1
2
ˆˆ γβα< + + <  for CCC-GJR(1,1) model indicating the sufficient 
conditions to ensure 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡2 > 0 are satisfied in these models. All currencies 
satisfy the second moment and the log-moment conditions, which are 
sufficient conditions for the QMLE to be consistent and asymptotically 
normal (see Ling and McAleer 2003). 
 
5 Prior 1984, NZD was pegged to a basket of currencies including USD, GBP, AUD, JPY and Deutsche 
Mark. In January 1984, NZD was allowed to float and suffered great devaluation against other major 
currencies. Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, http://www.rbnz.govt.nz 
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 Table 4.4 Parameter Estimates for CCC-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Normal Distribution 
USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
 
0.0055 0.0205 0.0190 0.0101 0.0067 0.0081 0.0482 0.0135 0.0057 0.0150 0.0117 0.0139 
(0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0250) (0.0051) (0.0016) (0.0055) (0.0042) (0.0046) 
 
0.0715 0.1008 0.0656 0.1208 0.0903 0.0847 0.0900 0.1323 0.0724 0.1669 0.1142 0.0796 
(0.0138) (0.0181) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0121) (0.0170) (0.0265) (0.0282) (0.0071) (0.0367) (0.0259) (0.0150) 
 
0.9175 0.8746 0.9033 0.8478 0.9013 0.8990 0.8493 0.8519 0.9159 0.8321 0.8693 0.8916 
(0.0150) (0.0230) (0.0183) (0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0201) (0.0560) (0.0310) (0.00970 (0.0325) (0.0290) (0.0204) 
Second Moment 0.9889 0.9754 0.9689 0.9686 0.9916 0.9837 0.9394 0.9842 0.9883 0.9990 0.9835 0.9712 
Log-Moment -0.0194 -0.0390 -0.0377 -0.0515 -0.0213 -0.0272 -0.0736 -0.0430 -0.0203 -0.0419 -0.0358 -0.0408 
(1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
(2) Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
 
 
ωˆ
αˆ
βˆ
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 Table 4.5 Parameter Estimates for CCC-GARCH(1,1) model 
 
Student-t Distribution 
USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
 
0.0056 0.0126 0.0173 0.0161 0.0080 0.0070 0.0372 0.0238 0.0057 0.0183 0.0100 0.0116 
(0.0021) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0135) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
 
0.0774 0.0890 0.0624 0.1409 0.0952 0.0783 0.0768 0.1236 0.0785 0.1775 0.0921 0.0884 
(0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0091) (0.0250) (0.0117) (0.0124) (0.0168) (0.0180) (0.0133) (0.0174) (0.0140) (0.0142) 
 
0.9151 0.9010 0.9102 0.8143 0.8969 0.9094 0.8777 0.8402 0.9138 0.8215 0.8955 0.8933 
(0.0148) (0.0172) (0.0139) (0.0334) (0.0117) (0.0140) (0.0311) (0.0224) (0.0137) (0.0174) (0.0184) (0.0164) 
 
4.4859 4.9669 6.1737 4.5052 4.4168 4.9232 6.3549 3.6847 4.4850 3.5207 4.2945 4.2950 
(0.2323) (0.3380) (0.4958) (0.3436) (0.2794) (0.3303) (0.5232) (0.1601) (0.2565) (0.1698) (0.3248) (0.2812) 
Second Moment 0.9925 0.9899 0.9726 0.9552 0.9921 0.9877 0.9545 0.9638 0.9923 0.9990 0.9876 0.9817 
Log-Moment -0.0215 -0.0455 -0.0346 -0.0512 -0.0214 -0.0310 -0.0553 -0.0186 -0.0227 -0.0413 -0.0367 -0.0418 
(1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
(2) Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
 
ωˆ
αˆ
βˆ
λˆ
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 Table 4.6 Parameter Estimates for CCC-GJR(1,1) model 
 
Normal Distribution 
USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
 
0.0060 0.0235 0.0174 0.0101 0.0067 0.0091 0.0363 0.0074 0.0063 0.0147 0.0119 0.0142 
(0.0019) (0.0081) (0.0055) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0183) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0052) (0.0043) (0.0047) 
 
0.0619 0.0707 0.0444 0.1180 0.0895 0.0676 0.0456 8.35E-06 0.0607 0.1567 0.1053 0.0723 
(0.0136) (0.0154) (0.0120) (0.0191) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0210) (9.03E-05) (0.0093) (0.0413) (0.0282) (0.0169) 
 
0.9157 0.8709 0.9103 0.8482 0.9011 0.8958 0.8827 0.9373 0.9140 0.8335 0.8681 0.8910 
(0.0163) (0.0257) (0.0180) (0.0091) (0.0117) (0.0218) (0.0435) (0.0102) (0.0098) (0.0324) (0.0295) (0.0207) 
 
-0.0183 -0.0531 -0.0329 -0.0053 -0.0018 -0.0327 -0.0488 -0.0956 -0.0221 -0.0175 -0.0184 -0.0135 
(0.0153) (0.0213) (0.0121) (0.0241) (0.0182) (0.0197) (0.0146) (0.0175) (0.0143) (0.0380) (0.0218) (0.0180) 
Second Moment 0.9867 0.9682 0.9711 0.9688 0.9915 0.9798 0.9527 0.9851 0.9857 0.9990 0.9826 0.9701 
Log-Moment -0.0193 -0.0234 -0.0340 -0.0773 -0.0245 -0.0232 -0.0556 -0.0678 -0.0197 -0.0491 -0.0288 -0.0338 
(1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
(2) Entries in bold and Italic denote 10% significant 
(3) Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
ωˆ
αˆ
βˆ
γˆ
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 Table 4.7 Parameter Estimates for CCC-GJR(1,1) model 
 
Student-t Distribution 
USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
 
0.0058 0.0136 0.0165 0.0017 0.0083 0.0074 0.0339 0.0086 0.0060 0.0183 0.0102 0.0117 
(0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0121) (0.0048) (0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0030) 
 
0.0724 0.0702 0.0470 5.35E-09 0.0904 0.0688 0.0491 8.68E-10 0.0722 0.1779 0.0856 0.0846 
(0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0114) (0.0002) (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0158) (0.0002) (0.0127) (0.0230) (0.0129) (0.0160) 
 
0.9144 0.9008 0.9141 0.9719 0.8958 0.9081 0.8891 0.9390 0.9129 0.8215 0.8945 0.8931 
(0.0148) (0.0185) (0.0158) (0.0004) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0286) (0.0230) (0.0134) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0163) 
 
0.0093 0.0297 0.0245 0.0481 0.0099 0.0180 0.0369 0.0890 0.0118 -0.0008 0.0129 0.0068 
(0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0114) (0.0036) (0.0165) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0283) (0.0129) (0.0246) (0.0153) (0.0157) 
 
4.4918 5.0298 6.2416 4.3169 4.4151 4.9359 6.4812 3.7383 4.4933 3.5211 4.2977 4.2953 
(0.2185) (0.3481) (0.5066) (0.3311) (0.2787) (0.3308) (0.5438) (0.1972) (0.2344) (0.1702) (0.3134) (0.2800) 
Second Moment 0.9914 0.9858 0.9733 0.9960 0.9912 0.9858 0.9566 0.9835 0.9910 0.9990 0.9866 0.9811 
Log-Moment -0.0203 -0.0266 -0.0326 -0.0057 -0.0255 -0.0250 -0.0514 -0.0221 -0.0209 -0.0491 -0.0299 -0.0343 
(1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
(2) Entries in bold and Italic denote 10% significant 
(3) Standard errors are in parenthesis 
ωˆ
αˆ
βˆ
γˆ
λˆ
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 Table 4.8 Parameter Estimates for DCC-GARCH(1,1) and DCC-GJR(1,1) 
models 
 
Normal Distribution Student-t Distribution 
DCC-GARCH(1,1) DCC-GJR(1,1) DCC-GARCH(1,1) DCC-GJR(1,1) 
  
0.0468 0.0479 0.0382 0.0373 
(0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
 
0.8984 0.8997 0.9617 0.9626 
(0.0281) (0.0276) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
 
1 2θ θ+  0.9452 0.9476 0.9999 0.9999 
λ   
4.6796 4.5697 
(0.1389) (0.1304) 
  (1) Entries in bold denote 1% significant 
  (2) Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
Table 4.8 summarizes the results for DCC estimates for all currencies. The 
estimated DCC parameters, 1θ  and  2θ , are statistically significant for all 
currencies, suggesting that the conditional correlations are not constant 
over time. Given that  1 2 1θ θ+ <  , the second moment condition is satisfied. 
Tables 4.9 to 4.12 provide the conditional correlations estimated by CCC-
GARCH(1,1) and CCC-GJR(1,1) models under normal and student-t 
distributions. Most of the time, all currencies are positively correlated 
and give similar estimates of conditional correlations between normal 
and student-t distributions. It can be seen that the currency pair of USD 
vs HKD displays the highest correlation at 0.9957, given that the 
currencies are pegged to each other, followed by USD vs TWD within a 
range of 0.9153 to 0.9158. While, the currency pair of NZD vs CNY has 
the lowest correlation within a range of 0.1955 to 0.2173.
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 Table 4.9 Conditional Correlations estimated by GARCH(1,1) model under Normal Distribution 
 USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
USD 1 0.5900 0.5816 0.3704 0.8778 0.8816 0.5028 0.4817 0.9957 0.5500 0.8537 0.9157 
JPY - 1 0.6217 0.3271 0.5839 0.7019 0.6716 0.3144 0.5930 0.3527 0.5958 0.5842 
GBP - - 1 0.3159 0.5105 0.6428 0.7737 0.3010 0.5877 0.3016 0.5550 0.5532 
NZD - - - 1 0.3533 0.3837 0.2971 0.1955 0.3735 0.2378 0.3504 0.3507 
KRW - - - - 1 0.8240 0.4526 0.4337 0.8787 0.5380 0.7965 0.8457 
SGD - - - - - 1 0.6058 0.4328 0.8840 0.5403 0.8645 0.8441 
CHF - - - - - - 1 0.2625 0.5094 0.2504 0.5084 0.4887 
CNY - - - - - - - 1 0.4829 0.2725 0.3585 0.4365 
HKD - - - - - - - - 1 0.5476 0.8521 0.9133 
IDR - - - - - - - - - 1 0.5372 0.5261 
MYR - - - - - - - - - - 1 0.8148 
TWD - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
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 Table 4.10 Conditional Correlations estimated by GARCH(1,1) model under Student-t Distribution 
 USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
USD 1 0.5894 0.5813 0.3718 0.8771 0.8817 0.5032 0.5181 0.9957 0.5471 0.8528 0.9153 
JPY - 1 0.6221 0.3283 0.5833 0.7023 0.6723 0.3363 0.5924 0.3508 0.5954 0.5821 
GBP - - 1 0.3168 0.5107 0.6433 0.7744 0.3258 0.5873 0.3000 0.5560 0.5523 
NZD - - - 1 0.3544 0.3854 0.2984 0.2087 0.3750 0.2386 0.3517 0.3523 
KRW - - - - 1 0.8238 0.4533 0.4644 0.8779 0.5350 0.7952 0.8451 
SGD - - - - - 1 0.6071 0.4649 0.8841 0.5371 0.8642 0.8433 
CHF - - - - - - 1 0.2851 0.5098 0.2496 0.5094 0.4886 
CNY - - - - - - - 1 0.5194 0.2890 0.3887 0.4709 
HKD - - - - - - - - 1 0.5447 0.8511 0.9128 
IDR - - - - - - - - - 1 0.5326 0.5236 
MYR - - - - - - - - - - 1 0.8130 
TWD - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
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 Table 4.11 Conditional Correlations estimated by GJR(1,1) model under Normal Distribution 
 USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
USD 1 0.5886 0.5791 0.3696 0.8776 0.8814 0.5021 0.5392 0.9957 0.5485 0.8530 0.9158 
JPY - 1 0.6192 0.3260 0.5834 0.7008 0.6713 0.3504 0.5916 0.3509 0.5947 0.5839 
GBP - - 1 0.3153 0.5087 0.6407 0.7717 0.3409 0.5852 0.2990 0.5528 0.5510 
NZD - - - 1 0.3531 0.3824 0.2966 0.2173 0.3725 0.2371 0.3494 0.3503 
KRW - - - - 1 0.8233 0.4527 0.4849 0.8784 0.5366 0.7955 0.8455 
SGD - - - - - 1 0.6057 0.4860 0.8838 0.5387 0.8635 0.8440 
CHF - - - - - - 1 0.2999 0.5087 0.2485 0.5078 0.4885 
CNY - - - - - - - 1 0.5408 0.2995 0.4090 0.4885 
HKD - - - - - - - - 1 0.5461 0.8515 0.9135 
IDR - - - - - - - - - 1 0.5357 0.5243 
MYR - - - - - - - - - - 1 0.8140 
TWD - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
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 Table 4.12 Conditional Correlations estimated by GJR(1,1) model under Student-t Distribution 
 USD JPY GBP NZD KRW SGD CHF CNY HKD IDR MYR TWD 
USD 1 0.5887 0.5794 0.3503 0.8765 0.8816 0.5022 0.5486 0.9957 0.5473 0.8519 0.9154 
JPY - 1 0.6204 0.3135 0.5831 0.7016 0.6718 0.3563 0.5917 0.3505 0.5946 0.5821 
GBP - - 1 0.3068 0.5087 0.6418 0.7726 0.3479 0.5854 0.2992 0.5542 0.5507 
NZD - - - 1 0.3331 0.3648 0.2883 0.2059 0.3529 0.2211 0.3316 0.3313 
KRW - - - - 1 0.8231 0.4524 0.4927 0.8774 0.5350 0.7940 0.8449 
SGD - - - - - 1 0.6066 0.4939 0.8840 0.5372 0.8635 0.8433 
CHF - - - - - - 1 0.3059 0.5087 0.2489 0.5086 0.4881 
CNY - - - - - - - 1 0.5502 0.3024 0.4164 0.4980 
HKD - - - - - - - - 1 0.5450 0.8504 0.9130 
IDR - - - - - - - - - 1 0.5326 0.5236 
MYR - - - - - - - - - - 1 0.8124 
TWD - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
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 Figure 4.5 CCC Conditional Correlations for Each Pair of Currency 
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the conditional correlations for all 66 pairs of 
currencies from 2 January 2003 to 31 December 2013 with 2,871 
observations. All currency pairs exhibit positive conditional correlations. 
The differences between normal and student-t distributions are barely 
distinguishable for all currency pairs. A constant perfect positive 
correlation is given by USD vs HKD since the currency pair is pegged. 
There are 12 currency pairs, namely, HKD vs MYR, HKD vs TWD, KRW vs 
HKD, KRW vs SGD, KRW vs TWD, MYR vs TWD, SGD vs HKD, SGD vs MYR, 
SGD vs TWD, USD vs KRW, USD vs MYR and USD vs SGD which display 
conditional correlations of higher than 0.8 consistently over the 
forecasting period. Some currency pairs, particularly those currency pairs 
with CNY, IDR, KRW, and NZD, include structural breaks that can also be 
seen at different points in time. Interestingly, those break points often 
shift to higher correlations after the structural breaks.  
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 Figure 4.6 DCC Conditional Correlations for Each Pair of Currency 
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Figure 4.6 presents the dynamic conditional correlations for all 66 pairs 
of currencies. Each currency pair shows the different and dynamic 
structure of conditional correlations over the entire forecasting period, 
thereby suggesting that the assumption of constant conditional 
correlations may not be appropriate. This result is in line with the other 
empirical studies, see, for examples, Longin and Solnik (1995), Tse (2000), 
and Nakatani and Teräsvirta (2009). Similarly, all currency pairs exhibit 
positive time-varying conditional correlations. However, the conditional 
correlations assuming student-t distribution are smoother than those 
obtained under the normal distribution. While, a constant perfect 
positive correlation is given by USD vs HKD since the currency pair is 
pegged. Nevertheless, most currency pairs show sharp declines in 
conditional correlations during the periods of GFC, from 2008 to 2009.  
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 Figure 4.7 Conditional Correlations for the Equally-weighted Portfolio  
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 Figure 4.7 shows the conditional correlations for the equally-weighted 
portfolio derived from CCC and DCC models that follow GARCH(1,1) and 
GJR(1,1) processes. It can be seen that the portfolio exhibits positive 
conditional correlations. On average, the CCC conditional correlation is 
constantly estimated at 0.56. While, DCC conditional correlations are 
very erratic. The empirical evidence suggests that the conditional 
correlation is not constant over time which justifies the use of a model 
such as DCC to capture the time-varying conditional correlation 
structures in foreign exchange returns. 
Figure 4.8 plots the conditional variances for the equally-weighted 
portfolio derived from CCC-GARCH(1,1), CCC-GJR(1,1), DCC-GARCH(1,1), 
and DCC-GJR(1,1) models. All models show similar dynamics of volatility. 
The GFC has a pronounced effect on the volatility of the portfolio returns, 
where a significant spike can be seen in the year 2008. Likewise, the level 
of volatility by DCC model displays a higher magnitude of 8 compared to 
CCC model at a magnitude of 6 during the GFC. 
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 Figure 4.8 Conditional Variances for the Equally-weighted Portfolio 
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 Table 4.13 VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
Model Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  -1.2943 (1) -1.1560 -5.6650 -0.7386 0.5336 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  -1.2956 (1) -1.1520 -5.6090 -0.7479 0.5386 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  -1.5071 (2) -1.3460 -6.5960 -0.8601 0.6214 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  -1.5072 (2) -1.3400 -6.5250 -0.8700 0.6265 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  -1.4636 (3) -1.3060 -6.4560 -0.7665 0.6098 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  -1.4635 (3) -1.2980 -6.3890 -0.7811 0.6150 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  -1.5199 (4) -1.3560 -6.5840 -0.8696 0.6287 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  -1.5179 (4) -1.3500 -6.4680 -0.8738 0.6326 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  -1.4877 (5) -1.3250 -6.4870 -0.7814 0.6230 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  -1.4853 (5) -1.3200 -6.3890 -0.7860 0.6271 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  -1.3336 (1) -1.1860 -6.3490 -0.7172 0.5896 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  -1.3353 (1) -1.1800 -6.2380 -0.7264 0.5952 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  -1.5148 (2) -1.3470 -7.2110 -0.8146 0.6697 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  -1.5166 (2) -1.3400 -7.0850 -0.8250 0.6761 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  -1.5080 (3) -1.3370 -7.2360 -0.7530 0.6732 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  -1.5085 (3) -1.3310 -7.1050 -0.7654 0.6792 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  -1.6029 (4) -1.4300 -7.4590 -0.7922 0.7249 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  -1.6001 (4) -1.4200 -7.2630 -0.8075 0.7288 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  -1.5929 (5) -1.4200 -7.4760 -0.7818 0.7286 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  -1.5891 (5) -1.4110 -7.2800 -0.7931 0.7324 
(1) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (4.6) based on a normal distribution 
(2) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (4.6) based on a normal distribution at the 
degrees of freedom set by t-density 
(3) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (4.6) based on a normal distribution at 
rolling degrees of freedom set by t-density 
(4) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (4.6) based on a student-t distribution at 
the degrees of freedom set by t-density 
(5) VaR forecasts are estimated from equation (4.6) based on a student-t distribution at 
rolling degrees of freedom set by t-density 
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 Table 4.13 summarizes the results for the 20 sets of VaR forecasts 
estimated by the CCC and DCC models. The means of VaR forecasts for 
the CCC and DCC models that utilized under student-t distribution appear 
to be lower than the means of VaR forecasts for the CCC and DCC models 
under the normal distribution. Hence, the student-t distribution provides 
more conservative VaR forecasts than a normal distribution. It can also 
be seen that the means of VaR forecasts estimated by the DCC models 
are mostly lower than the means of VaR forecasts estimated by the CCC 
models. In particular,  DCCGARCH tstdVaR − shows the lowest mean of VaR 
forecasts at -1.6029 while CCCGARCH NnormVaR − shows the highest mean of VaR 
forecasts at -1.2943. Hence, VaR forecasts estimated by the DCC models 
are crucial to improving the performance of VaR forecasts to 
accommodate the dynamic conditional correlations among foreign 
exchange returns.  
The time series of the daily portfolio returns together with VaR forecasts 
estimated by the CCC and DCC models are illustrated in Figure 4.9. It can 
be seen that the VaR forecasts based on student-t distribution are lower 
than the VaR forecasts based on normal distribution. The significant 
spikes of the portfolio returns indicated the events at which high 
volatility occurred, particularly in the periods from 1985 to 1987, from 
1992 to 1994, from 1998 to 2000, from 2001 to 2002, and from 2008 to 
2009 due to the US stock market crashes, EMS crisis, 9/11 events, Asian 
currency crisis and GFC, respectively. 
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 Figure 4.9 Portfolio Returns and VaR Forecasts at 1% Level 
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 Table 4.14 Number and Percentage of Violations for VaR Forecasts at 1% 
Level 
Model No. of Violation % of Violation Ranking 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  71 2.47% 20 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  69 2.40% 19 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  41 1.43% 8 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  39 1.36% 5 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  47 1.64% 16 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  45 1.57% 12 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  41 1.43% 8 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  40 1.39% 7 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  45 1.57% 12 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  45 1.57% 12 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  68 2.37% 18 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  64 2.23% 17 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  41 1.43% 8 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  39 1.36% 5 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  41 1.43% 8 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  41 1.43% 8 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  35 1.22% 2 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  33 1.15% 1 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  37 1.29% 4 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  35 1.22% 2 
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 Table 4.14 reports the number and percentage of violations for VaR 
forecasts. The ranking starts from 1 is the best model, i.e., the model that 
correctly forecasts market risk, and 20 is the worst model with a 
percentage of violation more than one percent, i.e., the model that 
underestimates market risk. High percentages of violations for 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  and CCCGJR NnormVaR − are given at 2.47% and 2.40%, respectively. 
Similarly,  DCCGARCH NnormVaR −  and  DCCGJR NnormVaR − present high percentages of 
violations at 2.37% and 2.23%, respectively. The best model is given by 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
− at 1.15%, followed by  DCCGARCH tstdVaR − and  DCCGJR tstdVaR η − at 1.22%. The 
highest percentage of violations at the lowest ranking is given by 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
− at 2.47%. It is worth noting that among the student- 
distribution models, the DCC models are preferred to the CCC models 
with the DCC models present the percentages of VaR violations that are 
closer to one percent.  
Figure 4.10 shows the time series of the daily portfolio returns during the 
forecast period and the time at which VaR violations occurred. A violation 
is recorded when an actual loss exceeds the VaR forecast. The episodes 
of VaR violations are often centralized during the periods of high volatility. 
The events of VaR violations under student-t distribution always give 
fewer violations than VaR violations under the normal distribution. 
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 Figure 4.10 Portfolio Returns and VaR Violations 
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 Table 4.15 Ratios for Absolute Deviation between Portfolio Returns and VaR 
Forecasts at 1% level 
Model Mean Median Minimum Maximum 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  1.024 1.009 0.00095 2.747 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  1.024 1.009 0.00271 2.683 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  1.015 1.008 0.00229 2.500 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  1.015 1.008 0.00103 2.447 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  1.017 1.008 0.00017 2.550 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  1.016 1.008 0.00073 2.494 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  1.016 1.008 0.00496 2.478 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  1.015 1.008 0.00164 2.447 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  1.016 1.008 0.00049 2.512 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  1.016 1.008 0.00245 2.480 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  1.022 1.009 0.00271 2.734 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  1.022 1.009 0.00356 2.667 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  1.015 1.008 0.00315 2.441 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  1.015 1.007 0.00183 2.467 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  1.015 1.008 0.00114 2.539 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  1.015 1.007 0.00087 2.480 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  1.013 1.007 0.00046 2.527 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  1.013 1.007 0.01378 2.399 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  1.013 1.007 0.00065 2.452 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  1.013 1.007 0.00707 2.410 
(1) The ratio is calculated by (VaR Forecast minus Actual Return) divided by Actual Return 
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 The magnitude of violations can be assessed by the ratios of absolute 
deviation between the actual returns and VaR forecasts. The regulator is 
concerned with whether the VaR forecasts are large enough to cover 
banks’ unexpected trading losses. Hence, the size of large losses can be 
determined by the magnitude of violations. Table 4.15 summarizes the 
ratios of actual losses to the length of VaR forecasts for all models. The 
highest mean ratio at 1.024 is given by  CCCGARCH NnormVaR − and CCCGJR NnormVaR − , 
followed by  DCCGARCH NnormVaR − and  DCCGJR NnormVaR − at a mean ratio of 1.022. While, 
the lowest mean ratio is shown by  DCCGARCH tstdVaR − ,  DCCGJR tstdVaR −  ,  DCCGARCH tstdVaR η −
and  DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
− at a mean ratio of 1.013.  
Figure 4.11 plots the ratios of actual returns to the length of VaR 
forecasts during the forecast period. A smaller magnitude of violations 
can be seen during periods of low volatility. Whereas, the highest 
magnitude of violations, i.e. the largest size of losses, occurred in the year 
of 2008. 
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 Figure 4.11 Absolute Deviation between Portfolio Returns and VaR 
Forecasts 
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 Table 4.16 Backtesting Results for VaR Forecasts at 1% level 
Model TUFF (1) UC (1) Ind (2) CC (2) 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  0.3715 44.6241 12.9469 57.5710 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  0.3715 41.0007 13.7388 54.7394 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  0.3715 4.6920 5.2691 9.9611 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  0.3715 3.3500 2.4869 5.8368 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 9.8707 7.1900 17.0607 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 7.9611 4.3391 12.3002 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  0.3715 4.6920 5.2691 9.9611 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  0.3715 3.9956 2.3324 6.3280 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 7.9611 7.7980 15.7591 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 7.9611 7.7980 15.7591 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  0.3715 39.2333 10.6979 49.9312 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  0.3715 32.4696 8.7800 41.2496 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  0.3715 4.6920 2.1846 6.8766 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  0.3715 3.3500 2.4869 5.8368 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 4.6920 2.1846 6.8766 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 4.6920 2.1846 6.8766 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  0.3715 1.3011 3.1780 4.4791 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  0.3715 0.6178 3.5724 4.1901 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 2.2160 2.8172 5.0331 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  0.3715 1.3011 3.1780 4.4791 
(1) The Unconditional Coverage (UC) and Time Until First Failure (TUFF) tests are 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 (1). 
(2) The Serial Independence (Ind) and Conditional Coverage (CC) tests are asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 (2). 
(3) Entries in bold denote rejection of the tests. 
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 The results from TUFF, UC, Ind and CC tests are presented in Table 4.16. 
The TUFF results for all models lead to correct acceptance of the test at 
a constant value of 0.3715. It can be seen that both CCC and DCC models 
under a normal distribution, fail UC, Ind and CC tests. This suggests that 
the VaR violations performed by these models are serially dependent. On 
the other hand,CCCGJR NstdVaR − , DCCGJR NstdVaR − , DCCGARCH tstdVaR − ,  DCCGJR tstdVaR − ,  DCCGARCH tstdVaR η −  
and  DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
− pass UC, Ind and CC tests. This shows that the VaR 
violations are likely to be independent and that a VaR violation today 
should not provide any information about whether or not a VaR violation 
will occur tomorrow. While, CCCGARCH NnormVaR − , CCCGJR NstdVaR η − , 
CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
− ,

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
− ,  DCCGARCH NstdVaR
−  ,  DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
− , and  DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  fail the UC and CC 
tests but pass Ind test.  
Table 4.17 summarizes the results for VaRmin at 1% level. It represents 
the lower VaR of the previous day or the average VaR on the previous 60 
days. These VaR values are used to verify the VaR forecasts from Table 
4.13. 
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 Table 4.17 VaRmin at 1% level 
Model Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  -1.3913 -1.2220 -5.6650 -0.8125 0.5869 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  -1.3949 -1.2170 -5.6090 -0.8183 0.5921 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  -1.6201 -1.4230 -6.5960 -0.9461 0.6834 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  -1.6227 -1.4150 -6.5250 -0.9520 0.6964 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  -1.5741 -1.3790 -6.4560 -0.9067 0.6704 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  -1.5767 -1.3730 -6.3890 -0.9035 0.6759 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  -1.6335 -1.4340 -7.0850 -0.9096 0.6919 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  -1.6330 -1.4340 -7.0850 -0.9096 0.6964 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  -1.5998 -1.4000 -6.4870 -0.9120 0.6853 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  -1.5990 -1.3910 -6.3890 -0.9042 0.6899 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  -1.4454 -1.2620 -6.3490 -0.7953 0.6460 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  -1.4496 -1.2630 -6.2380 -0.8009 0.6518 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  -1.6418 -1.4340 -7.2110 -0.9034 0.7337 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  -1.6464 -1.4340 -7.0850 -0.9096 0.7402 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  -1.6355 -1.4280 -7.2360 -0.8912 0.7373 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  -1.6386 -1.4250 -7.1050 -0.8877 0.7434 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  -1.7400 -1.5300 -7.4590 -0.9254 0.7947 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  -1.7382 -1.5190 -7.2630 -0.9356 0.7993 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  -1.7303 -1.5200 -7.4760 -0.8934 0.7984 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  -1.7274 -1.5070 -7.2800 -0.8877 0.8030 
(1) VaRmin is calculated as the negative of the higher VaR of the previous day or the 
average VaR over the past 60 days 
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 Table 4.18 Number and Percentage of Violations for Rolling VaR Violations  
Model No. of Violation % of Violation Ranking 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  60 2.09% 20 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  58 2.02% 19 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  36 1.25% 8 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  34 1.18% 5 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  43 1.50% 16 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  38 1.32% 13 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  36 1.25% 8 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  35 1.22% 7 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  40 1.39% 14 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  40 1.39% 14 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  52 1.81% 18 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  50 1.74% 17 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  36 1.25% 8 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  34 1.18% 5 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  36 1.25% 8 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  36 1.25% 8 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  28 0.97% 2 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  29 1.01% 1 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  32 1.11% 3 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  32 1.11% 3 
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 Table 4.18 reports the number and percentage of VaRmin violations on 
the previous 250 days. The regulator is concerned with whether the 
internal VaR models adopted by banks provide correct coverage for 
losses. Notice that the ranking presented in Table 4.18 is similar to the 
ranking listed in Table 4.14. The best model presented in this case is 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
− at 1.01%, given that it is the closest to one percent, followed 
by  DCCGARCH tstdVaR − at 0.97%. While,  DCCGARCH tstdVaR η −  and  DCCGJR tstdVaR η −  show similar 
percentages of violations at 1.11%. The highest percentage of VaR 
violations is given by CCCGARCH NnormVaR − at 2.09%. These results have an 
important consequence in forecasting VaR as the normal distribution can 
potentially underestimate market risk with the higher amount of capital 
charges. This may substantially increase a bank’s cost that cannot be 
used for other profitable purposes. An alternative solution is to use other 
distributions such as student-t distribution to accommodate large 
movements of asset returns in the market (see, for example, Bauwens 
and Laurent 2005). 
Table 4.19 shows the scaling factors as required by the Basel Committee. 
Of particular interest, CCCGARCH NnormVaR − gives the highest mean of scaling factor 
at a level of 3.4, while  DCCGJR tstdVaR − and  DCCGJR tstdVaR η − give the lowest mean of 
scaling factor at a level of 3.0. It can be seen that the median and the 
minimum scaling factor for all models present at a level of 3.0. While, a 
maximum level of 4.0 is observed for CCCGARCH NnormVaR − , CCCGJR NnormVaR − , and 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
− . 
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 Table 4.19 Scaling Factors 
Model Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  3.4 3.4 3.0 4.0 0.3450 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  3.3 3.4 3.0 4.0 0.3364 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.2321 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1944 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  3.2 3.0 3.0 3.9 0.2691 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.2159 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.2321 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.2208 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  3.2 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.2478 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  3.2 3.0 3.0 3.8 0.2478 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  3.3 3.0 3.0 4.0 0.3193 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  3.2 3.0 3.0 3.9 0.2860 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1997 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1776 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1976 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1776 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1548 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 0.1245 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  3.1 3.0 3.0 3.7 0.1742 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 0.1245 
(1) The scaling factor is calculated as 3+k, where k is the violation penalty 
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 Table 4.20 Capital Charges for VaRmin at 1% level 
Model Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  -4.79 -4.06 -22.66 -2.44 2.5215 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  -4.77 -4.01 -22.43 -2.46 2.5406 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  -5.18 -4.38 -24.74 -2.84 2.6551 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  -5.12 -4.36 -23.82 -2.86 2.5406 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  -5.13 -4.32 -24.86 -2.72 2.6680 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  -5.01 -4.28 -23.32 -2.71 2.4855 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  -5.22 -4.41 -24.61 -2.84 2.6874 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  -5.19 -4.38 -24.26 -2.88 2.6821 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  -5.15 -4.36 -24.31 -2.74 2.6518 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  -5.15 -4.35 -23.96 -2.71 2.6684 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  -4.87 -4.05 -25.39 -2.39 2.7387 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  -4.81 -4.01 -24.02 -2.40 2.6061 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  -5.19 -4.45 -26.32 -2.71 2.6897 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  -5.15 -4.34 -25.86 -2.73 2.7088 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  -5.15 -4.38 -26.41 -2.67 2.6938 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  -5.13 -4.31 -25.93 -2.66 2.7201 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  -5.41 -4.63 -26.10 -2.78 2.7875 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  -5.31 -4.59 -24.69 -2.81 2.5191 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  -5.41 -4.65 -26.17 -2.68 2.7925 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  -5.28 -4.56 -24.75 -2.67 2.5316 
(1) The  capital charge is calculated as the lower VaR of the previous day or the average 
VaR on the previous 60 days (VaRmin), multiplied by a scaling factor of (3+k), where k is 
the violation penalty 
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 Table 4.20 shows the market risk capital charges that are a product of 
VaRmin (Table 4.17) multiplied by a scaling factor (Table 4.19). It 
represents the capital requirements established by the Basel Accord. 
Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) and Pérignon, Deng, and Wang (2008) 
showed that banks tend to report high VaR forecasts that lead to an 
excessive amount of capital charges. In any case, there is an opportunity 
cost of misestimating VaR. Hence, pursuing a correct VaR model that can 
lead to the precision of determining minimum capital requirements is 
crucial for banks and the regulator (see Santos et al. 2012). In this case, 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
− and  DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
− provide the lowest mean of capital charges at 
-5.41.  DCCGJR tstdVaR −  and CCCGARCH tstdVaR − give a mean of capital charges at -5.31 
and -5.22, respectively. The lowest capital charge is given by  DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−
at -26.41, followed by  DCCGARCH NstdVaR − at -26.32, and  DCCGARCH tstdVaR η − at -26.17. 
These capital costs are mostly charged during the GFC, where sharp 
negative spikes of capital charges are shown in Figure 4.12. On the 
contrary, the highest capital charge is presented by  DCCGARCH NnormVaR − at – 2.39, 
followed by  DCCGJR NnormVaR −  at -2.40. This occurs during periods of low 
volatility in the foreign exchange market. 
Figure 4.12 demonstrates the episodes at which capital charges are most 
likely to occur. It can be seen that due to extreme negative returns during 
the GFC of 2008, the capital charges are imposed at the highest costs. 
This is mostly expected during extreme market conditions where higher 
capital charges are imposed to protect banks from the worst possible 
trading losses. 
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 Figure 4.12 Capital Charges and VaRmin at 1% level 
 
Page | 171  
 
  
Page | 172  
 
  
Page | 173  
 
  
Page | 174  
 
 Table 4.21 Proportion of Time Staying in a Color Zone 
Model Green Yellow Red 

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  44.83% 51.45% 3.76% 

CCCGJR N
normVaR
−  45.87% 50.40% 3.76% 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  73.35% 26.68% 0% 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  75.86% 24.17% 0% 

CCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  63.50% 36.54% 0% 

CCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  71.86% 28.18% 0% 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  73.35% 26.68% 0% 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  75.51% 24.52% 0% 

CCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  69.35% 30.69% 0% 

CCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  69.35% 30.69% 0% 

DCCGARCH N
normVaR
−  53.54% 43.61% 2.89% 

DCCGJR N
normVaR
−  55.83% 44.20% 0% 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR
−  74.82% 25.22% 0% 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR
−  82.79% 17.24% 0% 

DCCGARCH N
stdVaR η
−  77.60% 22.43% 0% 

DCCGJR N
stdVaR η
−  82.79% 17.24% 0% 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR
−  83.63% 16.41% 0% 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
−  89.31% 10.73% 0% 

DCCGARCH t
stdVaR η
−  78.75% 21.28% 0% 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR η
−  89.31% 10.73% 0% 
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 Figure 4.13 VaR Violations and VaRmin at 1% level 
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Table 4.21 provides the proportion of time staying in the green, yellow 
and red zones. The green zone is desirable by all banks, as this indicates 
that no excessive violations occur. A bank is categorized in the red zone 
if its VaR model is not appropriate, and will be required to pay a greater 
amount of capital charges. Figure 4.13 exhibits the periods of when the 
green, yellow and red zones are likely to occur for all VaR models. In most 
cases, the models tend to stay in the green and yellow zones during 
periods of low volatility with fewer VaR violations. With exception to

CCCGARCH N
normVaR
− ,CCCGJR NnormVaR − , and  DCCGARCH NnormVaR − , these models spend some time 
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 in the red zone due to excessive negative movements during the GFC. 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
− ,  DCCGARCH tstdVaR − , and  DCCGJR NstdVaR − models spend a very large 
proportion of time in the green zone, and substantially spending less 
time in the yellow zone. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter emphasizes the importance of accommodating time-varying 
conditional correlations in forecasting VaR. These findings are crucial for 
banks and the regulator since a correct VaR model leads to increase 
efficiency in measuring market risk, hence leading to determine 
minimum capital requirements. In this chapter, two multivariate 
volatility models, namely CCC and DCC models, are considered to 
forecast VaR. These models are estimated by GARCH(1,1) and GJR1,1) 
processes under normal and student-t distributions. The results show 
that a student-t distribution gives a more robust estimation of VaR 
forecasts than a normal distribution, given that the foreign exchange 
returns exhibit heavy tails (see, Lee, Chiou, and Lin 2006, and, Pesaran 
and Pesaran 2010). The results also find that the VaR forecasts based on 
DCC models are superior to VaR forecasts based on the CCC models with 
the DCC models have lower numbers and percentages of VaR violations 
that are closer to one percent. Consequently, the time-varying 
conditional correlation highlights the importance of accommodating 
significant changes in the correlation between asset returns in 
forecasting VaR. Also, CCC models deliver a higher amount of capital 
charges compared to the DCC models. These results are consistent with 
the empirical findings by da Veiga, Chan, and McAleer (2008).  
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 From the above discussions,  DCCGJR tstdVaR −  has always represented the most 
appropriate model given that it provides the lowest number of violations 
and a percentage of violation that is very close to one percent. Also, the 
model has the lowest mean ratio of absolute deviation for VaR violations. 

DCCGJR t
stdVaR
− has correctly accepted all statistical tests including TUFF, UC, 
Ind and CC tests. Based on the backtesting procedures as outlined by the 
Basel Accord, the model has consistently stayed in the green zone with 
no excessive violations occur in the red zone thus, no severe violation 
penalty is imposed. While, the mean and median of scaling factor are also 
maintained at a level of 3.0, with an exception of the highest scaling 
factor at 3.5 during the GFC of 2008. This implies that the scaling factors 
are consistently kept at a level of 3.0, which is mostly desirable by banks 
without suffering additional penalty charges. It is worth noting that the 
model leads to a mean of capital charges at -5.31 with VaRmin at -1.7382. 
In most cases, CCCGARCH NnormVaR − presents the least appropriate model given 
that it has the highest number and percentage of violations. The model 
fails all statistical tests with serial dependent and excessive violations. 
The model also has the highest mean ratio of absolute deviation for VaR 
violations. It can be seen that the model has a maximum scaling factor of 
4 with the mean and median of scaling factor at a level of 3.4. However, 
the model has the lowest mean of capital charges at -4.79 with VaRmin at 
-1.3913. Therefore, the assumption of normality has a tendency of 
providing less conservative VaR forecasts and often with excessive 
violations but at a lower amount of capital charges. While, student-t 
distribution inclines to provide lower VaR forecasts with fewer violations, 
but usually at a higher amount of capital charges.  Given that a higher 
amount of capital charge represents an additional cost to the banks, 
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 these results show that banks should exercise great care in selecting an 
optimal VaR model. 
Incorporating multivariate volatility in VaR models is not straightforward 
where there are many other factors to be considered. These models raise 
some difficulties in practice, where banks trade with relatively large and 
complex portfolios that are unlikely to change daily. This implies that 
each day, the banks would have to compute a series of historical data for 
the new portfolios to estimate VaR. This may create additional costs to 
the banks. Instead of using these models, banks appear to be taking less 
computationally demanding alternatives. Banks prefer to use a simple 
VaR model that aggregates all of the risks of a portfolio into a single 
number, which is suitable for use in the boardroom, reporting to the 
regulator and disclosure in their financial reports. Nonetheless, 
multivariate volatility models play a significant role in the study of VaR as 
they are very useful to measure and manage market risk. 
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET RISK REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK UNDER BASEL III 
 
[THIS CHAPTER IS PERMANENTLY EXEMPTED FROM THE 
THESIS INDEFINITELY] 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines the tale of two perspectives in the context of 
Australian risk management in theory and in practice. Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
is established as an important risk measure to control and manage 
market risk. The popularity of VaR models is partly due to their 
conceptual simplicity and partly from the requirements of Basel Accord 
to the regulation of the banking system. Basel III explicitly recognizes the 
role of VaR where the banks must implement and report to monitor their 
market risk exposure and to determine the amount of regulatory capital 
requirements. Consequently, the Basel Accord also establishes the 
penalties for inadequate VaR models, hence, there are incentives to 
pursue practical approaches to forecasting VaR.  
Following the recent regulatory changes in Basel III, the need to 
understand the risk management practices in Australia is becoming more 
urgent and pronounced.  The thesis begins with an overview of the 
regulatory changes to Basel III with an emphasis on the influence of these 
regulations on market risk exposure. The Basel Accord requires 
Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) to measure their VaR 
forecasts on a daily basis using one or more risk models. To further 
evaluate and improve VaR procedures, this thesis concentrates on 
developing an alternative model to forecast VaR. The risk estimates of 
these models that are used to determine the capital charges and 
associated costs of ADIs depending on the number of previous VaR 
violations. At 99 percent confidence level, if an ADI’s internal model leads 
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 to a greater number of violations than reasonably expected, a violation 
penalty at a multiplication factor of 3 k+  will be imposed. Then, the ADI 
will be required to hold a greater amount of capital charges including the 
penalty charges.  
The thesis provides new information about how VaR models can be 
improved by estimating market risk and suggest a superior forecasting 
model to produce an optimal risk measure for assessing market risk. The 
study will proceed by the application of VaR to optimize capital charges 
for Australian authorized deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) in 
accommodating market risk to an acceptable level. 
This thesis proposes a consistent estimator of the tail index for the 
asymmetric extension of Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GJR-GARCH) error by Glosten, Jagannathan, and 
Runkle (1993). The thesis then applies the proposed estimator to forecast 
VaR for a portfolio of the Australian dollar with twelve other currencies 
and compares its performance with the more traditional approaches 
based on conditional and unconditional variances. The results suggest 
that the proposed method performed reasonably well against the 
traditional approaches, and it has the advantage of accommodating 
information from the time-varying volatility without the need for 
computing the conditional variances on a regular basis. Thus, it provides 
a more computationally efficient approach to forecasting VaR.  
This thesis compares the performance of univariate and multivariate 
conditional volatility models in forecasting VaR. The thesis considers the 
Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model of Bollerslev (1990); and 
models that allow dynamic conditional correlation such as the Dynamic 
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 Conditional Correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002) and the Time-
Varying Conditional Correlation (TVC) model of Tse and Tsui (2002). 
While the underlying assumptions vary between these models, their 
common objective is to model the volatility of multiple assets by 
capturing their possible interactions. Thus, they provide more 
information about the underlying assets that could not be recovered by 
univariate models. However, the practical usefulness of these models is 
limited by their complexity as the number of asset increases. The results 
found that VaR forecasts based on the DCC models are superior to VaR 
forecasts based on the CCC models. The time-varying conditional 
correlation highlights the importance of accommodating significant 
changes in the correlation between asset returns in forecasting VaR. 
Furthermore, the results also find that a student-t distribution gives a 
more robust estimation of VaR forecasts than a normal distribution. 
Hence, the selection of a distribution assumption proves to be a more 
important consideration than the choice of a model to improve the 
performance of VaR forecasts. 
This thesis examines the information content of reported VaR forecasts 
on ADI’s trading revenues in a simple linear regression framework. The 
idea is that if the reported VaR forecasts are adequate, then they should 
be related to ADI’s future trading revenues. The results support this 
hypothesis for some ADIs. Due to data limitation on the number of 
observations and the frequency of data, the thesis cannot utilize more 
sophisticated techniques that are standard in financial econometrics. 
One of the main objectives for Basel III is to strengthen banks’ 
transparency and disclosures. The thesis finds that the current financial 
reporting environment in Australia does not provide academic 
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 researchers and the regulator enough information to assess the quality 
of VaR forecasts reported by ADIs. It is also worth noting that the 
requirements for banks to disclose information more completely can 
sometimes be very costly and may not necessary increase transparency. 
This thesis has significant theoretical and practical implications. In theory, 
the proposed VaR models may be preferred for risk forecasting to 
accommodate for dynamic volatility in situations when very large and 
extreme returns occurred in a high volatility period. In practice, the 
ability to model VaR may be constrained by limited data availability, 
computational burdens and subsequent increase of costs. Most of these 
criticisms have been stressed by banks and the regulator. While the 
current regulatory framework implements a set of standards to manage 
and control the market risk exposure, the framework has yet to develop 
an alternative approach that can satisfy all practical and regulatory 
objectives. In reality, the role of academic researchers is crucial to enable 
feedback and to provide continuous engagement with the banks and the 
regulator. This, in effect, means that the academic researchers need to 
become more relevant to the regulatory process if banks and the 
regulator are to engage with them. Similarly, banks and the regulator 
should seek an increased level of engagement with the academic 
researchers. Subsequently, a more rigorous research to the 
understanding and the practice of VaR can be connected between banks 
and the regulator with the academic researchers. 
The research undertaken in this thesis can be extended in the following 
manners. First, a wider selection of distributional assumptions can be 
used. These include the asymmetric distributions, for example, 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED) by Nelson (1991). Second, a large 
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 and more complex portfolio can be constructed assuming different 
weight structures, for example, the application of optimal weights in a 
portfolio in evaluating the performance of VaR forecast. Third, 
alternative univariate and multivariate conditional volatility models can 
also be considered, for example, the Exponential GARCH model of Nelson 
(1991), and Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (BEKK) model described by 
Engle and Kroner (1995). Lastly, the use of ultra-frequency data, for 
example, 1-hour, 5-minute and 1-minute data can be applied to produce 
daily VaR forecasts. 
Page | 192  
 
 REFERENCES 
 
Acerbi, C., and D. Tasche. 2002a. "Expected Shortfall: A Natural Coherent 
Alternative to Value at Risk."  Economic Notes 31 (2):379-388. 
Acerbi, C., and D. Tasche. 2002b. "On the Coherence of Expected 
Shortfall."  Journal of Banking & Finance 26 (7):1487-1503. 
Alexander, C. 2001. "Orthogonal GARCH."  Mastering Risk 2:21-38. 
Allen, D. E, and R. Powell. 2012. "The Fluctuating Default Risk of 
Australian Banks."  Australian Journal of Management 37 (2):297-
325. 
Angelidis, T., A. Benos, and S. Degiannakis. 2004. "The Use of GARCH 
Models in VaR Estimation."  Statistical Methodology 1 (1–2):105-
128. 
Artzner, P., F. Delbaen, J. M. Eber, and D. Heath. 1999. "Coherent 
Measures of Risk."  Mathematical Finance 9 (3):203. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2004. Report into Irregular 
Currency Options Trading at the National Australia Bank. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2007a. "Preparing for Basel II 
in Australia: Part 1."  InFinance (Sydney, NSW) 121 (3):16-17. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2007b. "Introduction to Basel 
II: Part 2."  InFinance (Sydney, NSW) 121 (4):24-25. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2011a. Layers of Safety in the 
Australian Financial System. Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority. 
Page | 193  
 
 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2011b. The Origins of APRA. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2011c. What is Risk? : 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2013a. Prudential Standard 
APS 330 - Capital Adequacy: Public Disclosure. Australia Prudential 
Regulation Authority. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2013b. Prudential Standard 
APS 110 - Capital Adequacy. Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2013c. Prudential Standard 
APS 116 - Market Risk. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2014a. APRA's Submission to 
the 2014 Financial System Inquiry. Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority  
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 2014b. Financial System 
Inquiry Submission. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Basak, S., and A. Shapiro. 2001. "Value-at-Risk-Based Risk Management: 
Optimal Policies and Asset Prices."  The Review of Financial Studies 
14 (2):371-405. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 1996. Amendment to the 
Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. Basel, Switzerland: 
Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 1998. Operational Risk 
Management. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Page | 194  
 
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2006. Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version. Basel, Switzerland: 
Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2011a. Basel III: A Global 
Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking 
Systems - Revised Version. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for 
International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2011b. Principles for the Sound 
Management of Operational Risk. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for 
International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2013. The Regulatory 
Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and 
Comparability. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014a. A Brief History of the 
Basel Committee. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014b. Basel III Leverage Ratio 
Framework and Disclosure Requirements. Basel, Switzerland: Bank 
for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014c. Implementation of 
Basel Standards: A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of 
the Basel III Regulatory Reforms. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for 
International Settlements. 
Page | 195  
 
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014d. Operational Risk: 
Revisions to the Simpler Approaches - Consultative Document. 
Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014e. Regulatory Consistency 
Asessment Programme (RCAP): Assessment of Basel III Regulations 
- Australia. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014f. Revisions to the 
Standardised Approach for Credit Risk - Consultative Document. 
Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements. 
Bauwens, L., and S. Laurent. 2005. "A New Class of Multivariate Skew 
Densities, With Application to Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity Models."  Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics 23 (3):346-354. 
Bera, A. K., and S. W. Kim. 2002. "Testing Constancy of Correlation and 
Other Specifications of the BGARCH Model with An Application to 
International Equity Returns."  Journal of Empirical Finance 9 
(2):171-195. 
Berkes, I., L. Horváth, and P. Kokoszka. 2003. "Estimation of the Maximal 
Moment Exponent of a GARCH(1,1) Sequence."  Econometric 
Theory 19 (4):565-586. 
Berkowitz, J., and J. O'Brien. 2002. "How Accurate are Value-at-Risk 
Models at Commercial Banks?"  Journal of Finance 57 (3):1093-
1111. 
Bollerslev, T. 1986. "Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity."  Journal of Econometrics 31:307-327. 
Page | 196  
 
 Bollerslev, T. 1987. "A Conditionally Heteroskedastic Time Series Model 
for for Speculative Prices and Rates of Return."  Review of 
Economics & Statistics 69 (3):542. 
Bollerslev, T. 1990. "Modelling The Coherence in Short-Run Nominal 
Exchange Rate: A Multivariate Generalized ARCH Approach."  
Review of Economics & Statistics 72 (3):498-505. 
Bollerslev, T., R. F. Engle, and J. M. Wooldridge. 1988. "A Capital Asset 
Pricing Model with Time-Varying Covariances."  Journal of Political 
Economy 96 (1):116-131. 
Bougerol, P., and N. Picard. 1992. "Stationarity of GARCH Processes and 
of Some Nonnegative Time Series."  Journal of Econometrics 52 (1–
2):115-127. 
Boussama, F. 2000. "Asymptotic Normality for the Quasi-Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator of a GARCH Model."  Comptes Rendus de 
l'Académie des Sciences 331 (1):81-84 (in French). 
Caporin, M., and M. McAleer. 2012. "Do We Really Need Both BEKK and 
DCC? A Tale of Two Multivariate GARCH Models."  Journal of 
Economic Surveys 26 (4):736-751. 
Caporin, M., and M. McAleer. 2014. "Robust Ranking of Multivariate 
GARCH Models by Problem Dimension."  Computational Statistics 
& Data Analysis 76 (0):172-185. 
Christoffersen, P. 1998. "Evaluating Interval Forecasts."  International  
Economic Review 39:841-862. 
Christoffersen, P. F., F. X. Diebold, and T. Shuermann. 1998. "Horizon 
Problems and Extreme Events in Financial Risk Management."  
Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank of New York 4 
(3):109-118. 
Page | 197  
 
 Christoffersen, P., J. Hahn, and A. Inoue. 2001. "Testing and Comparing 
Value-at-Risk Measures."  Journal of Empirical Finance 8 (3):325-
342. 
da Veiga, B., F. Chan, and M. McAleer. 2008. "Evaluating the Impact of 
Market Reforms on Value-at-Risk Forecasts of Chinese A and B 
Shares."  Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 16 (4):453-475. 
da Veiga, B., F. Chan, and M. McAleer. 2011. "It Pays to Violate: How 
Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties in Encouraging Risk 
Management?"  Accounting & Finance 52 (1):95-116. 
Danıélsson, J. 2002. "The Emperor has No Clothes: Limits to Risk 
Modelling."  Journal of Banking & Finance 26 (7):1273-1296. 
Danielsson, J., and C. G.  de Vries. 2000. "Value-at-Risk and Extreme 
Returns."  Annales d'Économie et de Statistique (60):239-270. 
Daníelsson, J., B. N. Jorgensen, G. Samorodnitsky, M. Sarma, and C. G. de 
Vries. 2013. "Fat Tails, VaR and Subadditivity."  Journal of 
Econometrics 172 (2):283-291. 
Davis, K. 2007. "Banking Concentration, Financial Stability and Public 
Policy." The Structure and Resilience of the Financial System, 
Kirribilli, Australia. 
DeMiguel, V., L. Garlappi, and R. Uppal. 2009. "Optimal Versus Naive 
Diversification: How Inefficient is the 1/N Portfolio Strategy?"  
Review of Financial Studies 22 (5):1915-1953. 
Dickens, C. 1902. A Tale of Two Cities. London: James Nisbet & Company 
Limited. 
Diebold, F. X., and M. Nerlove. 1989. "The Dynamics of Exchange Rate 
Volatility: A Multivariate Latent Factor ARCH Model."  Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 4 (1):1-21. 
Page | 198  
 
 Ding, Z., C. W. J. Granger, and R. F. Engle. 1993. "A Long Memory Property 
of Stock Market Returns and a New Model."  Journal of Empirical 
Finance 1 (1):83-106. 
Drost, F. C., and T. E. Nijman. 1993. "Temporal Aggregation of Garch 
Processes."  Econometrica 61 (4):909-927. 
EDHEC. 2008. The EDHEC European Investment Practices Survey 2008. 
France: EDHEC-Risk Institute. 
Engle, R. F. 1982. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with 
Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation."  
Econometrica 50:987-1007. 
Engle, R. F. 2002. "Dynamic Conditional Correlation: A Simple Class of 
Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity Models."  Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics 20 (3):339-350. 
Engle, R. F., and K. F. Kroner. 1995. "Multivariate Simultaneous 
Generalized ARCH."  Econometric Theory 11 (1):122-150. 
Engle, R. F., V. K. Ng, and M. Rothschild. 1990. "Asset Pricing with a 
Factor-ARCH Covariance Structure: Empirical Estimates for 
Treasury Bills."  Journal of Econometrics 45 (1–2):213-237. 
Fama, E. F. 1965. "The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices."  The Journal of 
Business 38 (1):34-105. 
Fiano, F. 2014. "The World's Top 50 Safest Banks 2014." Global Finance 
Magazine, September 9. 
Frey, R., and A. J. McNeil. 2002. "VaR and Expected Shortfall in Portfolios 
of Dependent Credit Risks: Conceptual and Practical Insights."  
Journal of Banking & Finance 26 (7):1317-1334. 
Page | 199  
 
 Garcia, R., É. Renault, and G. Tsafack. 2007. "Proper Conditioning for 
Coherent VaR in Portfolio Management."  Management Science 53 
(3):483-494. 
Glosten, L. R., R. Jagannathan, and D. E. Runkle. 1993. "On the Relation 
between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal 
Excess Return on Stocks."  Journal of Finance 48 (5):1779-1801. 
Gregoriou, G. N. 2009. Operational Risk toward Basel III : Best Practices 
and Issues in Modeling, Management, and Regulation. New Jersey: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Hamer, C. D., and P. G. Rivett. 2004. Investigation into Foreign Exchange 
Losses at the National Australia Bank. PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Hill, B. M. 1975. "A Simple General Approach to Inference About the Tail 
of a Distribution."  The Annals of Statistics 3 (5):1163-1174. 
Hill, J. B. 2010. "On Tail Index Estimation for Dependent, Heterogeneous 
Data."  Econometric Theory 26 (05):1398-1436. 
Hirtle, B. J. 2003. "What Market Risk Capital Reporting Tells Us about 
Bank Risk."  Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York 9 (3):37-54. 
Hlatshwayo, L. N. P., M. A. Petersen, J. Mukuddem-Petersen, and C. 
Meniago. 2013. "Basel III Liquidity Risk Measures and Bank 
Failure."  Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2013:19. 
Hogan, W. P., and I. G. Sharpe. 1990. "Risk-Based Capital Adequacy of 
Australian Banks."  Australian Journal of Management (University 
of New South Wales) 15 (1):177. 
Hols, M. C. A. B., and C. G. De Vries. 1991. "The Limiting Distribution of 
Extremal Exchange Rate Returns."  Journal of Applied Econometrics 
6 (3):287-302. 
Page | 200  
 
 Hsu Ku, Y. H., and J. J. Wang. 2008. "Estimating Portfolio Value-at-Risk via 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation MGARCH Model - An Empirical 
Study on Foreign Exchange Rates."  Applied Economics Letters 15 
(7):533-538. 
Ibragimov, R. 2009. "Portfolio Diversification and Value at Risk under 
Thick-Tailedness."  Quantitative Finance 9 (5):565-580. 
Iglesias, E. M. 2012. "An Analysis of Extreme Movements of Exchange 
Rates of the Main Currencies Traded in the Foreign Exchange 
market."  Applied Economics 44 (35):4631-4637. 
Iglesias, E. M., and M. D. Lagoa Varela. 2012. "Extreme Movements of the 
Main Stocks Traded in the Eurozone: An Analysis by Sectors in the 
2000's Decade."  Applied Financial Economics 22 (24):2085-2100. 
Iglesias, E.M., and B.O. Linton. 2009. "Estimation of Tail Thickness 
Parameters from GARCH Models."Working Paper, Michigan State 
University and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
International Monetary Fund. 2010. Australia: Basel II Implementation 
Assessment. In IMF Country Report. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
International Monetary Fund. 2012. Australia: Financial System Stability 
Assessment. In IMF Country Report. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Jeantheau, T. 1998. "Strong Consistency of Estimators for Multivariate 
Arch Models."  Econometric Theory 14 (1):70-86. 
Jondeau, E., and M. Rockinger. 2006. "The Copula-GARCH Model of 
Conditional Dependencies: An International Stock Market 
Application."  Journal of International Money and Finance 25 
(5):827-853. 
Page | 201  
 
 Jorion, P. 1996. "Risk ²: Measuring the Risk in Value at Risk."  Financial 
Analysts Journal 52 (6):47-56. 
Jorion, P. 2002. "How Informative are Value-at-Risk Disclosures?"  
Accounting Review 77 (4):911-931. 
Jorion, P. 2007. Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing 
Financial Risk. 3rd ed. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. 
Kearns, P., and A. Pagan. 1997. "Estimating the Density Tail Index for 
Financial Time Series."  The Review of Economics and Statistics 79 
(2):171-175. doi: 10.2307/2951449. 
Keeler, D. 2009. "World's 50 Safest Banks 2009." Global Finance 
Magazine, August 25. 
Kupiec, P. 1995. "Techniques for Verifying the Accuracy of Risk 
Measurement Models."  Journal of Derivatives 3:73-84. 
Lee, M. C., J. S. Chiou, and C. M. Lin. 2006. "A Study of Value-at-Risk on 
Portfolio in Stock Return using DCC Multivariate GARCH."  Applied 
Financial Economics Letters 2 (3):183-188. 
Ling, S., and M. McAleer. 2003. "Asymptotic Theory for a Vector ARMA-
GARCH Model."  Econometric Theory 19 (2):280-310. 
Liu, C. C., S. G. Ryan, and H. Tan. 2004. "How Banks' Value-at-Risk 
Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank 
Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time."  Review of 
Accounting Studies 9 (2/3):265-294. 
Longin, F., and B. Solnik. 1995. "Is the Correlation in International Equity 
Returns Constant: 1960–1990?"  Journal of International Money 
and Finance 14 (1):3-26. 
Page | 202  
 
 Lucas, A. 2001. "Evaluating the Basle Guidelines for Backtesting Banks' 
Internal Risk Management Models."  Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 33 (3):826-846. 
Mandelbrot, B. 1963. "The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices."  The 
Journal of Business 36 (4):394-419. 
Markowitz, H. 1959. Portfolio Selection : Efficient Diversification of 
Investments. New York, United States of America: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 
Markowitz, H. 1991. "Foundations of Portfolio Theory."  The Journal of 
Finance 46 (2):469-477. 
McAleer, M. 2005. "Automated Inference and Learning in Modeling 
Financial Volatility."  Econometric Theory 21 (01):232-261. 
McAleer, M., F. Chan, S. Hoti, and O. Lieberman. 2008. "Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Correlation."  Econometric Theory 24 
(06):1554-1583. 
McAleer, M., F. Chan, and D. Marinova. 2007. "An Econometric Analysis 
of Asymmetric Volatility: Theory and Application to Patents."  
Journal of Econometrics 139 (2):259-284. 
McAleer, M., S. Hoti, and F. Chan. 2009. "Structure and Asymptotic 
Theory for Multivariate Asymmetric Conditional Volatility."  
Econometric Reviews 28 (5):422-440. 
McAleer, M., J. Jimenez-Martin, and T. Pérez-Amaral. 2010. "A Decision 
Rule to Minimize Daily Capital Charges in Forecasting Value-at-
Risk."  Journal of Forecasting 29 (7):617-634. 
Mikosch, T., and C. Starica. 2000. "Limit Theory for the Sample 
Autocorrelations and Extremes of a GARCH (1, 1) Process."  The 
Annals of Statistics 28 (5):1427-1451. 
Page | 203  
 
 Moosa, I., and K. Burns. 2013. "The Basel III Controversy: A Critical 
Assessment of the Views of Australian Regulators."  The Finsia 
Journal of Applied Finance (2):26-29. 
Moosa, I., and P. Silvapulle. 2012. "An Empirical Analysis of the 
Operational Losses of Australian Banks."  Accounting & Finance 52 
(1):165-185. 
Nakatani, T., and T. Teräsvirta. 2009. "Testing for Volatility Interactions 
in the Constant Conditional Correlation GARCH model."  
Econometrics Journal 12 (1):147-163. 
Nelson, D. 1991. "Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New 
Approach."  Econometrica 59:347-370. 
Patton, A. J. 2002. "Applications of Copula Theory in Financial 
Econometrics." Ph.D. in Economics, University of California. 
Payaslioǧlu, C. 2009. "A Tail Index Tour across Foreign Exchange Rate 
Regimes in Turkey."  Applied Economics 41 (3):381-397. 
Pérignon, C., Z. Y. Deng, and Z. J. Wang. 2008. "Do Banks Overstate their 
Value-at-Risk?"  Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (5):783-794. 
Pérignon, C., and D. R. Smith. 2008. "A New Approach to Comparing VaR 
Estimation Methods."  Journal of Derivatives 16 (2):54-66. 
Pérignon, C., and D. R. Smith. 2010a. "The Level and Quality of Value-at-
Risk Disclosure by Commercial Banks."  Journal of Banking & 
Finance 34 (2):362-377. 
Pesaran, B., and M. H. Pesaran. 2010. "Conditional Volatility and 
Correlations of Weekly Returns and the VaR Analysis of 2008 Stock 
Market Crash."  Economic Modelling 27 (6):1398-1416. 
Poon, S. H., and C. W. J. Granger. 2003. "Forecasting Volatility in Financial 
Markets: A Review."  Journal of Economic Literature 41 (2):478-539. 
Page | 204  
 
 Power, M. 2005. "The Invention of Operational Risk."  Review of 
International Political Economy 12 (4):577-599. 
Reserve Bank of Australia. 2009. "The Australian Financial System." 
Financial Stability Review, March. 
RiskMetrics Group. 1996. RiskMetrics Technical Document. J. P. Morgan 
Co. 
Rockafellar, R. T., and S. Uryasev. 2002. "Conditional Value-at-Risk for 
General Loss Distributions."  Journal of Banking & Finance 26 
(7):1443-1471. 
Rodgers, D. 2015. Credit Losses at Australian Banks: 1980 - 2013. In 
Research Discussion Paper: Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Rombouts, J. V. K., and M. Verbeek. 2009. "Evaluating Portfolio Value-at-
Risk using Semi-Parametric GARCH Models."  Quantitative Finance 
9 (6):737-745. 
Rutkowski, M., and S. Tarca. 2014. Assessing the Basel II Internal Ratings-
Based Approach: Empirical Evidence from Australia. In eprint arXiv: 
1412.0064. 
Santos, A. A. P., F. J. Nogales, and E. Ruiz. 2013. "Comparing Univariate 
and Multivariate Models to Forecast Portfolio Value-at-Risk."  
Journal of Financial Econometrics 11 (2):400-441. 
Santos, A. A. P., F. J. Nogales, E. Ruiz, and D. V. Dijk. 2012. "Optimal 
Portfolios with Minimum Capital Requirements."  Journal of 
Banking & Finance 36 (7):1928-1942. 
Santos, J. A. C. 2001. "Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking 
Theory: A Review of the Literature."  Financial Markets, 
Institutions & Instruments 10 (2):41-84. 
Page | 205  
 
 Soczo, C. 2002. "Comparison of Capital Requirements Defined by Internal 
(VaR) Model and Standardized Method."  Periodica Polytechnica. 
Social and Management Sciences 10 (1):53-66. 
Tsay, R. S. 2010. Analysis of Financial Time Series. 3rd ed. Vol. John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. Hoboken, N.J.: Hoboken, New Jersey. 
Tse, Y. K. 2000. "A Test for Constant Correlations in a Multivariate GARCH 
Model."  Journal of Econometrics 98 (1):107-127. 
Tse, Y. K., and A. K. C. Tsui. 2002. "A Multivariate Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity Model with Time-
Varying Correlations."  Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 20 
(3):351-362. 
van der Weide, R. . 2002. "GO-GARCH: A Multivariate Generalized 
Orthogonal GARCH Model."  Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 
(5):549-564. 
Wagner, N., and T. A. Marsh. 2005. "Measuring Tail Thickness under 
GARCH and An Application to Extreme Exchange Rate Changes."  
Journal of Empirical Finance 12 (1):165-185. 
Wang, J. N., J. H. Yeh, and N. Y. P. Cheng. 2011. "How Accurate is the 
Square-Root-of-Time Rule in Scaling Tail Risk: A Global Study."  
Journal of Banking & Finance 35 (5):1158-1169. 
Wright, S. 1999. "The Development of the Australian Banking Industry."  
The Australian Banker 113 (4):18-21. 
Yamai, Y., and T. Yoshiba. 2005. "Value-at-Risk versus Expected Shortfall: 
A Practical Perspective."  Journal of Banking & Finance 29 (4):997-
1015. 
 
Page | 206  
 
 Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of 
copyright material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner 
who has been omitted or incorrectly acknowledged. 
 
 
Page | 207  
 
 Appendix I 
AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY 
(APRA) CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
 
 
 
 
[THIS APPENDIX IS PERMANENTLY EXEMPTED FROM THE 
THESIS INDEFINITELY] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 208  
 
 Appendix II 
ETHICS APPROVAL BY CURTIN UNIVERSITY 
 
[THIS APPENDIX IS PERMANENTLY EXEMPTED FROM THE 
THESIS INDEFINITELY] 
 
Page | 209  
 
